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COMMENT 
WHERE ARE THE PARENTS? 
PARENTAL CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 
ACTS OF CHILDREN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 20, 1999, Dylan Klebold, age seventeen and Eric 
Harris, age eighteen, walked into their high school in Colum-
bine, Colorado and opened fire on fellow students and faculty.1 
Armed with a handgun, two shotguns, and a rifle, they killed 
twelve students, one teacher, and wounded twenty-three oth-
ers.2 This was not just an impromptu spree.3 Before commit-
ting the massacre Klebold and Harris copied school keys, ac-
quired guns, kept a diary describing their plans, made bombs 
and planted them in the school, and even warned a student to 
leave the school before they began shooting.4 Then, after their 
homicidal acts, both Klebold and Harris committed suicide. 5 
The two killers plotted their attack on Columbine High 
School for more than a year.6 They planned when they would 
1 
See John Cloud, Just a Routine School Shooting, TIME, May 31,1999, at 36-37. 
2 See id. 
3 See Nancy Gibbs and Timothy Roche, The Columbine Tapes, TIME, Dec. 20, 1999, 
at 43. 
4 See Bill Dedman, Secret Service Is Seeking Pattern for School Killers, N.Y. TIMEs, 
June 21, 1999, at A-12. 
5 
See Cloud, supra note 1. 
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strike and where they would place the pipe bombs used in the 
massacre.7 Harris also maintained a website that brazenly 
described the dimensions and "nicknames" of his homemade 
bombs, the targets of his wrath, and his dark philosophy of 
life.s Even more chilling, the two made five home video tapes 
before the massacre.9 The tapes were meant by the killers to 
describe how and why they acted.10 What the tapes reveal, 
however, is their indiscriminate hatred of others and their de-
sire to be famous for their intended crimes. 11 
There were significant warning signs, like flashing red 
lights, that apparently no one, not even their parents, paid any 
attention to. 12 The police recovered two sawed oft' shotguns 
and bomb materials from Harris' bedroom that had been left in 
plain sight.13 Several months prior to the massacre, Harris' 
father discovered and disarmed a bomb Harris had made.14 It 
is rumored that Mr. Harris did not report this because his son 
was already on probation for an attempted car theft,15 commit-
ted with Klebold, a year before.1s Additionally, a teacher at 
7 See id. at 44. 
8 See ill. at 46. 
9 See id. at 40. The tapes were made in the basement of the Harris home, after the 
parents went upstairs to bed and were asleep. The "secret tapes" were made known to 
the public approximately eight months after the tragedy. ld. 
10 See Gibbs, supra note 3 at 44. 
11 See ill. Klebold discusses their hatred "all Diggers, spics, Jews, gays, fucking 
whites," and others that they believed had abused them or who had failed to defend 
them. Their hope was to kill as many as 250 people. ld. at 42. Klebold and Harris 
wanted movies to be made about their lives and actions and discussed the Hollywood 
names who might best represent them on film. "Directors will be fighting over this 
story ... Spielberg .. Tarantino.· ld. 
12 
See id. at 45. 
13 See Cissy Taylor, Parental Liability Can't Be Criminal Under New Hampshire's 
Laws, THE UNION LEADER, Apr. 28, 1999, at A-I. 
14 See Good Morning America: Home Videos of High School Killers (ABC Television 
broadcast, May 24, 1999) (interview with Nate Dykeman, friend of Eric Harris) [here-
inafter Good Morning America]. 
15 See NBC Nightly News: Background into Trenchcoat Mafia Suspects and Their 
Crime (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 21, 1999) [hereinafter NBC Nightly News]. 
16 See Good Morning America, supra note 14. 
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Columbine High School had warned the parents that the boys' 
class essays included graphic descriptions of killings.17 The 
killers' parents may have turned a blind eye to these signs; 
however, before the boys turned the guns on themselves and 
while the attack on Columbine was still being played out on 
TV, Mr. Harris called his wife, then his attorney. IS For months 
thereafter, the Harris' were silent to police questioning while 
they sought immunity from criminal prosecution.19 
One year earlier, on May 20, 1998, in Springfield, Oregon, 
fifteen-year old Kipland Kinkel killed both of his parents as 
they arrived home from work. 2O The next morning, as his par-
ents lay dead, Kinkel armed himself with a .22 caliber semi-
automatic rifle and two pistols and went to Thurston High 
School, where he shot and killed two students and wounded 
twenty others.21 Like Columbine, there were warning signs 
that pointed to a very troubled youth.22 Kinkel got caught shop 
lifting in 1996 and in January 1997 he was arrested for 
throwing rocks off a freeway overpass and hitting passing 
cars.23 His parents knew of his obsession with guns and explo-
sives and were concerned for his safety and the safety of oth-
ers.24 Consequently, they sought counseling for their son 
through a psychologist, who, subsequently prescribed Prozac 
for Kinkel's depression.25 In April 1997, Kinkel was suspended 
from school for kicking another student in the head after the 
student pushed him.25 In September 1997, Kinkel gave an in-
17 
See James Brooke, Teacher of Colorado Gunmen Alerted Parents, N.Y. TIMEs, 
May 11, 1999, at A-14. 
IS 
See Gibbs, supra note 3 at 49. 
19 
See id. at 50. 
20 See Frontline: The Killer At Thurston High; School Shooters (PBS television 
broadcast, January 21, 2000) [hereinafter Frontline: School Shooters]. 
21 
See Cloud, supra note 1. 
22 . 
See Frontllne, supra note 20. 
23 
See id. 
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structional speech at school about how to make a bomb.27 Fi-
nally, in December 1997, Kinkel's father talked with a 
stranger he had met at the airport and confided that his son 
had a troubled past, was playing with explosives, and was be-
coming increasingly difficult to control. 28 Despite all of this, 
Kinkel's father purchased two guns for him, but only on the 
condition that he not use them unsupervised.29 That "condi-
tion" was obviously, and perhaps forseeably, breached. 
These incidents reveal an alarming pattern of violence by 
children. Over the last three years children have killed or 
wounded students, faculty, and others in eight school shoot-
ingS.30 On February 2, 1996, fourteen-year old Barry Loukaitis 
killed one teacher, two students and wounded one student with 
a .30-30 caliber rifle taken from his home in Moses Lake, 
Washington.31 On October 1, 1997, sixteen-year old Luke 
Woodham killed two students and wounded seven others with 
a .30-.30-caliber rifle taken from his home in Pearl, Missis-
sippi.32 He also stabbed his mother to death.33 On December 1, 
1997, fourteen-year old Michael Carneal killed three students 
and wounded five others with a .22 caliber Ruger pistol stolen 
from his neighbor's father in West Paducah, Kentucky.M On 
March 24, 1998, in Jonesboro, Arkansas, eleven-year old An-
drew Golden and thirteen-year old Mitchell Johnson killed one 
teacher and four students and wounded ten others in a sniper 
attack on their school.35 The two boys were armed with three 
rifles and seven handguns stolen from relatives' homes.36 On 
27 See Frontline: School Shooters, supra note 20. 
28 See id. The stranger happened to be an Oregon University professor who spe-
cialized in juvenile violence. See id. 
29 See id. 
30 
See Cloud, supra note 1. 
31S id ee . 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
M See id. 
35 
See Cloud, supra note 1. 
3S See id. 
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May 20, 1999, exactly one month after the Columbine shoot-
ings, fifteen-year old Thomas Solomon wounded six students at 
Heritage High School in Conyers, Georgia with a .22 caliber 
rifle taken from a cabinet in his home.37 Evidence found in the 
boy's bedroom included printouts of bomb making instructions, 
notes on where to plant explosives at the school, and diaries 
recording his despair.38 He is currently being detained at a 
juvenile detention center.39 
The last school shooting of the twentieth century occurred 
in Fort Gibson, Oklahoma, on December 6, 1999.40 There, a 
seventh grader walked into his middle school armed with a 
semi-automatic handgun and opened fire, wounding four stu-
dents:1 The boy was described as a popular honors student 
from a good family who had just celebrated his thirteenth 
birthday:2 When police asked him why he did it, he replied "I 
don't know.,,43 
Society grieves over the extraordinary violence of its chil-
dren, while professionals and parents struggle to understand 
the reasons for such actions.44 One response to the rash of 
school shootings has been an attempt to psychologically "pro-
file" potentially violent children so that parents, teachers, and 
37 See id. 
38 See id. at 35. 
39 
See id. at 36-37. 
40 See Lois Romano, 4 Hurt in School Shooting, S.F. CHRONICLE, December 7,1999, 
at AS. 
41 




44 See Jeff Kass, Portrait of Two Teens Reveals a lot of Gray, THE CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, May 3, 1999,3; Frontline: School Shooters, supra note 20; Mother 
Questions Who Her Son Was, Everyone is Trying To Figure Out Why Teens Went on a 
Rampage, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Apr. 26, 1999, at 7A; Tom Mashberg, Violence 
May Be a Gender Issue; Experts Fret That Boys are Being Raised to Explode, THE 
BoSTON HERALD, May 23, 1999, at 007. 
5
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professionals can identify them before the violence occurs.45 
Another response to the shootings has been to characterize the 
perpetrators in a sociological context to better understand the 
causes of their anger.45 Some researchers and psychologists 
believe that such violence may be a gender issue, since none of 
the assailants in these school shootings have been female.47 
While others agree that such violence may, in fact, be a gender 
issue, they are angry that youth violence is only now being 
taken seriously.48 They argue that youth violence has been 
occurring in urban areas involving minorities 49 since the late 
1980'S,50 but because such violence has now involved white, 
suburban youth, it is receiving more media and professional 
attention. 51 Thus, while we search for understanding and ways 
to prevent future acts of youth violence, the warning signs may 
have always been there, but not taken seriously by those who 
might have been able to make a difference.52 
45 
Dedman, supra note 4. See also Frontline: School Shooters, supra note 20. The 
year following the Springfield, Oregon school shooting, the American Psychological 
Association issued "22 Warning Signs" that might indicate the possibility of violence. 
Additionally, the National School Safety Center issued "Checklist of Characteristics of 
Youth Who Have Caused School-Associated Violent Deaths" and the National Center 
for the Prevention of Crime issued a list of "Signs That Kids Are Troubled." Such lists 
of early warning signs for potentially violent children have become extremely popular. 
See id. 
45 See Mashberg, supra note 44, at 007. See also Stephanie Salter, 'Blinded By 
Love' and By Stereotyping, THE PALM BEACH POST, May I, 1999, at 15A. 
47 See Mashberg, supra note 44, at 007. See also Cloud, supra note 1 (identifying 
the school shooters of the last three years as young, white males, some clinically de-
pressed, with access to weapons from either their homes or from friends and neigh-
bors). 
48 See Michael Romano, 'No One Seems to Recognize' Urban Violence - Minority 
Students See Double Standard after Columbine, THE RoCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 16, 
1999, at 32A. 
49 See id. 
50 See Linda A Chapin, Note, Out of Control? The Uses and Abuses of Parental Li-
ability Laws to Control Juvenile Delinquency in The United States, 37 SANTA CLARA L. 
REv. 621 (1997) (citing Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 510 (Cal. 1993». 
51 
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Not only does society want to know why such violence oc-
curs, but it also wants to know who to blame for it. Conse-
quently, victims and their families are seeking legislative re-
form53 and new civil remedies.54 For example, the availability 
of guns has sparked much discussion about limiting the sale of 
firearms, a solution that is gaining support in our state and 
federal legislatures.65 Until these tragedies occurred, such at-
tempts had long languished on the legislative floor.66 In addi-
tion, victims and their families are increasingly seeking justice 
in civil lawsuits against those that they believe are responsible 
for infusing youthful killers.67 In most cases, it is the parents 
that are being sued civilly for failing to control their children.68 
However, lawsuits are now being brought against non-
traditional defendants, such as gun makers, the media, and 
web sites for their roles in inducing violence.69 
63 See Mike Allen, Gun Owners Fear Connecticut Bill on Gun Seizures, N.Y. TIMEs, 
May 31, 1999, at A9; Frank Bruni and James Dao, Gun Control Bill Rejected In House 
Bipartisan Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, June, 19, 1999, at AI; Fox Butterfield, Limits on Power 
and Zeal Hamper Firearms Agency, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1999, at AI; Guns in the 
House, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,1999, at A30; Alison Mitchell, Politics Among Culprits In 
Death of Gun Control, N.Y. TIMEs, June 19, 1999, at A19; Sam Howe Verhorvek. Fire-
arms Limits Gaining Support in Legislatures, N.Y. TIMEs, May 31, 1999, at AI. 
54 See Frontline: School Shooters, supra note 20. 
66 




See Frontline: School Shooters, supra note 20. 
68 See id. The parents of one of the students injured in the Springfield, Oregon 
shooting filed a $14.5 million lawsuit against Kip Kinkel and the estate ofbis parents. 
The parents of Columbine victim Isaiah Shoels filed a $250 million wrongful death suit 
against the parents of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold. The families of five of the 
Jonesboro, Arkansas victims filed a lawsuit against the two shooters and their par-
ents, claiming negligent training and supervision. The parents of the victims in Padu-
cah, Kentucky filed suit against the shooter, bis parents, students who had seen the 
shooter with a gun on previous occasions, and the neighbor from .whom the shooter 
took the gun. The mother of one of the Pearl, Mississippi victims filed a lawsuit 
against the school district and the parents of six of the students, claiming that the six 
students were part of a cult-like group and that the parents could have taken steps to 
prevent the shooting. See id. 
69 See id. As of the time of this writing the Shoels family may also add two gun 
manufacturers to their wrongful death lawsuit. Twenty Columbine families have filed 
"intent to sue" notices against local government agencies, and the school district. The 
parents of the Paducah, Kentucky victims filed suit in federal court against twenty-
7
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A significant question that has yet to be answered is that of 
parental criminal liability. Since the goals of a peaceful society 
are best promoted by the prevention of crime, there is an ex-
pectation that parents be responsible for the violence of their 
own children. In the absence of such prevention, however, is it 
legally possible to hold parents criminally responsible for the 
violence of their children?60 In the Columbine massacre, for 
example, many people continue to question whether the 
Klebold and Harris families knew of their sons' elaborate and 
deadly plans.61 Did the parents of these two boys see the 
warning signs of the coming tragedies, yet fail to act to protect 
others?62 The role that the parents of these young men played 
in this tragedy, if any, is still being investigated.6S The District 
Attorney, however, has not ruled out bringing charges, but 
five media companies, including Time Warner, for making violent films. They are also 
suing eleven video game companies. The five Jonesboro, Arkansas families are also 
suing gun manufacturers for not manufacturing guns with trigger locks. See id. 
60 
Some have suggested that parents should be held criminally liable for their roles 
in their child's criminal behavior. See Kathy Kiely and Gary Fields, Colorado Killers' 
Last Days Gave No Hint of Plans, USA TODAY, May 3, 1999, at 7A See also Fox But-
terfield, A Friendly Game Leads To A Charge of Murder, N.Y. TIMES, August 5, 1999, 
at A12. Dr. Stephen Hartgarten, director of the Firearm Injury Center at Medical 
College of Wisconsin in Milwaukee, stated in his discussion about the use and avail-
ability of firearms to children, "[t]o cast the blame on the people who pull the trigger 
does not address the question of how we can reduce the number of these shootings .... 
[t]here should be more punishment of adults who allow children access to firearms." 
Id. 
61 . . 
See Jim Hughes and Jason Blevms, Father Had Hunch Son Was Involved, THE 
DENVER POST, Apr. 22, 1999, at A-14; Mother Questions Who Her Son Was, Everyone Is 
Trying To figure Out Why Teens Went On A Rampage, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Apr. 
26, 1999, at 7A; Kiely, supra note 60; Karen Lowe, As Shock Of Shooting Wanes, 
Search For Blame Picks Up, AGENCE PREss FRANCE, Apr. 26, 1999. 
62 
See James Brooke, Teacher Of Colorado Gunmen Alerted Parents, The N.Y. 
TIMEs, May 11, 1999, at A-14; Parents Of Teen Killer Noticed "Tension" Before School 
Rampage, AGENCE PREss FRANCE, Apr. 26, 1999; NBC Nightly News, supra note 13; 
Lynn Bartels, Klebolds Never Knew, Friend Says, RoCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 26, 
1999, at 5A; Gaod Morning America, supra note 14. 
6S . 
See Lowe, supra note 61. See also Gibbs, supra note 3 at 50. 
8
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currently lacks sufficient evidence of wrongdoing against 
them.64 
A finding of liability for wrongdoing will generally begin 
under the premise that individuals whose actions result in the 
death of another may be criminally responsible under different 
homicide theories.65 Unquestionably, individuals, including 
children, may be held criminally responsible when their direct 
acts result in the death of another person.66 The criminal law 
has, however, taken this one step further so that individuals 
may be held criminally responsible when their indirect acts, or 
their failures to act, result in the death of another person.67 So 
long as these acts or omissions meet the definition of "grossly 
negligent,,,ss they will result in second-degree murder or invol-
untary manslaughter charges.69 Consequently, individuals can 
be criminally responsible for another person's death even when 
they do not actually deliver the deathblow to the victim.70 
This Comment will examine the legal possibility of impos-
ing parental criminal liability for the crimes committed by the 
direct acts of their children. Part II of this article will describe 
64 
See Gibbs, supra note 3 at 50. The Klebolds met with investigators tp answer 
questions within ten days of the shootings. The Harris', however, did not speak with 
investigators for months because they were seeking immunity. See id. 
65 
See generally SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAw AND 
ITS PROCESSES, 385 • 545 (6th ed. 1995). 
66 . 




68 Fitzgerald v. State, 20 So. 966 (Ala. 1896). The court reversed an involuntary 
manslaughter conviction because the trial court instructed the jury that ordinary 
negligence constituted manslaughter. See id. at 968. The death occurred as a result 
of an unintended shooting when the victim asked the defendant to hand him a pistol 
from behind the counter and the gun went off. See id. at 966. The court stated that 
criminality is predicated "not upon mere negligence or carelessness, but upon that 
degree of negligence or carelessness which is denominated as 'gross' and which consti-
tutes such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily careful and 
prudent man under the same circumstances as to furnish evidence of that indifference 
to consequences which in some offenses takes the place of criminal intent." Id. at 967. 
69 
See LAFAVE, supra note 66, § 3.7, at 234. 
70 
See id. § 3.3, at 210. 
9
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the elements required to impose criminal liability, specifically 
for the convictions of involuntary manslaughter and murder by 
depraved indifference. These elements are then juxtaposed 
against those required in civil tort law, which are substantially 
similar and therefore must apply to hold parents responsible 
for the deaths of third parties.71 Next, because parental crimi-
nal liability cases have not yet occurred, Part III will investi-
gate cases in which the elements required for criminal convic-
tion were satisfied and that are analogous to situations in 
which a prosecutor might bring a homicide charge against par-
ents for the criminal acts of their child. Part IV will then ex-
plain the reasons for the lack of parental criminal convictions 
despite the application of a strict legal analysis, the result of 
which does not preclude a homicide charge for the acts or 
omissions of a parent. Rather, criminal law suggests that li-
ability may be imposed based on the independent conduct of 
the parent that ultimately resulted in the death of another, not 
because of the person's status as parent. Finally, Part V will 
argue that legislators should develop minimum reasonable 
standards for parental negligence, and will propose that spe-
cific negligent homicide statutes be enacted if parents are to be 
held liable for their own negligent actions. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A person who is responsible for the death of another may be 
liable under civil law, criminal law, or both.72 In the civilli-
ability context, the basis of which is tort law,73 parentalliabil-
ity for the acts of minor children takes two forms: vicarious 
tort liability74 and, of particular interest to this Comment, pa-
71 See infra note 309 and accompanying text, discussing the similarities between 
civil and criminal law. 
72 
See LAFAVE, supra note 66, § 1.3, at 14. 
73 
See DAN B. HOBBS AND PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION, at 2 (3d. ed. 
1997). A tort is defined as a civil wrong in which a remedy may be obtained, usually 
damages, through a lawsuit. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 1496 (7th ed. 1999). 
74 
See W. PAGE KEETON, et aI., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS, § 123, 
at 913 (5th ed. 1984). 
10
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rental negligence. 76 Vicarious liability imputes the liability of 
one person to another by reason of a special relationship that 
exists between the twO.76 Vicarious tort liability did not exist 
under the common law, but today it is imposed by statute and 
exists in most states.77 Parental negligence, however, has de-
veloped under the common law and is such that one family 
member may be responsible for the torts of another through 
his or her own acts or failure to act.7S Under this theory, a per-
son may be liable for his or her negligent acts when that per-
son has a duty to another, breaches that duty, and that breach 
causes another person's injury or death.79 
In the criminal context, parents can be found liable in two 
ways: under the classifications of homicide80 and under paren-
tal responsibility statutes. SI The categories for traditional 
homicide are murder and manslaughter.s2 While murder re-
quires a showing of malice through an intentional, knowing, or 
consciously reckless act or omission that causes another per-
son's death,83 involuntary manslaughter generally requires 
only criminally negligent conduct.84 Under the second method 
76 
See id. 
76 See id. § 12, at 499. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 927 (7th ed. 1999). Vicarious 
Liability is "liability that a supervisory party (such as an employer) bears for the ac-
tionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an employee) because of the 
relationship between the two parties." Id. 
77 




See id. § 30, at 164-65. 
80 . 
See KADISH, supra note 65 at 385. Homicide is the unlawful killing of a human 
being by another human being. See id. 
S1 See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering 1999). This section was enacted in 
1988 in reaction to gang violence and authorizes jail terms and criminal fines for neg-
ligent supervision and control of a child which causes, encourages, or contributes to 
the delinquency of a minor. See also ALA. CODE § 12-15-13 (1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
709A.l (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3612 (1998); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 530.060(1) 
(1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.050 (1999); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-B: 41 (1999); 
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 260.10(2) (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-316.1 (1999). 
S2 
See KADISH, supra note 65, at 385-86. 
83 
See LAFAVE, supra note 66, § 7.1, at 190. 
84 
See supra note 66, § 7.9, at 251. 
11
Lockwood: Criminal Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000
508 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
of liability, parental responsibility statutes hold parents crimi-
nally liable when their children commit acts of juvenile delin-
quency while in possession of a firearm, while operating a ve-
hicle, for violating truancy and curfew laws, or other specific 
violations.85 These statutes, either by judicial interpretation or 
by express language, require the element of criminal intent,86 
or criminal negligence87 by the parent, as well as requiring the 
parent's act or failure to act to be the proximate cause of the 
child's act.86 
85 See generally Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Criminal Responsibility of 
Parents for Act of Child, 12 A.L.R. 4th 673 (2000) (chronicle of criminal parental li-
ability case8 and analysis). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering 1999). Section 
272 provides that every person who commits any act or omits any duty causing, en-
couraging, or contributing to the dependency or delinquency of a minor is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. A 1988 amendment to the section provides that parents or guardians 
have the duty to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control over 
their children. See id. See also St. Clair Shores, Mich., Parental Responsibility Ordi-
nance 20.560-20.563 § 3b (1994), which reads: 
Included (without limitation) in this continuous duty of reasonable 
parental control are the following parental duties: 
To keep illegal drugs or illegal firearms out of the home and legal 
firearms locked in places that are inaccessible to the minor. 
To know the Curfew Ordinance of the City of St. Clair Shores, and to 
require the minor to observe the Curfew ordinance ... 
To require the minor to attend regular school sessions and to forbid 
the minor to be absent from class without parental or school permis-
sion. 
To arrange proper supervision for the minor when the parent must 
be absent. 
To take the necessary precautions to prevent the minor from mali-
ciously or willfully destroying real, personal, or mixed property which 
belongs to the City of St. Clair Shores, or is located in the City of St. 
Clair Shores. 
To forbid the minor from keeping stolen property, illegally possess-
ing firearms or illegal drugs, or associating with known juvenile delin-
quents, and to seek help from the appropriate governmental authori-
ties or private agencies in handling or controlling the minor, when 
necessary.ld. 
86 
See LAFAVE, supra note 66, § 3.4, at 212. 
87 
See id. § 3.7, at 234. 
88 See e.g., Seleina v. Seleina, 93 N.Y.S.2d 42 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1949) (contributing to 
the delinquency of a minor); McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046 (N.H. 
1981) (curfew); In re Jeanette L., 523 A.2d 1048 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (truancy). 
12
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A. PARENTAL TORT LIABILITY FOR VIOLENT ACTS OF THE CmLD 
The most widely used method for imposing civil liability on 
parents when their children cause injury or death to another 
person is to bring an action under tort law for either vicarious 
liability or civil negligence.89 These theories are favored be-
cause they allow the wronged parties to obtain monetary com-
pensation for damages suffered.90 At common law, parents 
were not liable under the civil negligence theory for the tor-
tious acts of their children simply because they were parents.91 
Rather, parents were only liable when their acts or omissions 
were negligent in relation to the child's acts.92 For example, a 
parent could be liable under general tort principles when the 
parent aided or encouraged his or her child's tortious conduct.93 
The common law courts also did not hold parents vicariously 
liable based solely on the relationship between parent and 
child;94 rather, parents were vicariously liable only when the 
child acted as the parent's "agent" or "employee" and within 
the scope of such agency or employment.95 
89 
See supra, note 54. 
90 
See Hobbs, supra note 73. 
91 . 
See KEETON, supra note 74, § 123, at 913. 
92 See id. §l23, at 913.914. 
93 See Trahan v. Smith, 239 S.W. 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). In Trahan, the father 
was held liable for death of neighbor's pig because his sons acted under his direction. 
The court stated "As a general rule to hold a parent liable for the tortious act of his 
minor child, it must appear that the tort was committed at the direction of the parent, 
express or implied, or within the scope of duties imposed on the minor by the parent." 
[d. at 347. See also Condel v. Savo, 39 A2d 51 (Pa. 1944) (holding parents liable when 
they failed to exercise due care to control their child knowing of his vicious disposi· 
tion); Stewart v. Swartz, 106 N.E. 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 1914) (holding that father was 
negligent when he permitted child to stretch a rope across the road, injuring plaintift); 
Smith v. Jordan, 97 N.E. 761 (Mass. 1912) (holding that father was negligent when 
son, acting on his instructions, injured another in an automobile accident). 
94 See Linder v. Bidner, 50 Misc. 2d. 320, 270 N.Y.S. 2d 430 (N.Y. 1966). 
95 
Graham v. Page, 132 N.E. 817 (ill. 1922) (holding that daughter acted as father's 
agent while driving vehicle in course of his business and injuring plaintift); McCrossen 
v. Moorehead, 142 N.E. 318 (N.Y. 1922) (holding that daughter acted as father's agent 
while driving vehicle in compliance with his request to assist her mother); Zeidler v. 
Goezler, 211 N.W. 140 (Wis. 1921) (stating that son took father's automobile at fa· 
ther's request and for his benefit); Smith v. Jordan, 97 N.E. 761 (Mass. 1912). 
13
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1. Parental Civil Liability Is Imposed Vicariously By Statute 
The limited common law liability of parents has been ex-
tended by statute in most states.96 Although the vicarious li-
ability statutes vary, their general purpose is to provide dam-
ages for victims when children are not, or cannot be, finan-
cially responsible.97 Another purpose is to encourage parents 
to better supervise their children so as to prevent increased 
acts of juvenile delinquency.9s Monetary recovery under these 
statutes, however, is limited,99 and predicated on a showing of 
willful or wanton conduct of the child. 100 
96 ALAsKA STAT. § 34.50.020 (Michie 1999), limit $2,000; ARIz. REv. STAT. § 12-661 
(1999), joint and several liability; CAL. CN. CODE § 1714.1 (Deering 1999), limit 
$25,000; COW. REv. STAT. § 13-21-107 (1998), limit $3,500; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572 
(1999), limit $5,000; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 3922 (1999), limit $5,000; FLA. STAT. ch. 
§ 741.24 (1999), actual damages; HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 577-3 (Michie 1999), joint 
and several liability; IDAHO CODE § 6-210 (1999), limit $2,500; ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 
740 115/1 (West 1999), no limit; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-120 (1998), limit $1,000; Ky. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 405.025 (Michie 1998), limit $2,500, cumulative total $25,000 per 
child; LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 1999), no limit; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & Jun. 
PRoc. § 3-829 (1999), limit $10,000; MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 231 § 85G (Law. Co-op. 
1999), limit $5,000; MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-2 (1999), limit $5,000; MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 40-6-237 (1999), limit $2,500; NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-801 (Michie 1999), limit 
$1,000; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-27 (Michie 1994), limit $4,000; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw 
§ 3-112 (McKinney 1999), limit $5,000 in some instances; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 
3109.09 (Anderson 1999), limit $5,000 in some instances; OKLA. STAT. tit. 23 § 10 
(1999), limit $2,500; OR. REV. STAT. § 30.765 (1997), limit $7,500; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
5505 (1999), limit $1,000 per person, $2,500 per tort; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-3 (1999), 
limit $1,500; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-15 (Michie 1999), limit $1,500; TENN. CODE 
ANN. §37-10-101 (1999), limit $10,000; TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (West 1999), 
limit $25,000; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-20 (1999), limit $2,000; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 
901 (1999), limit $5,000; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-44 (Michie 1999), limit $2,500; WASH. 
REv. CODE § 4.24.190 (1999), limit $5,000; WIS. STAT. § 895.035 (1998), limit $2,500; 
WyO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-203 (Michie 1999), limit $2,000. 
97 
See KEETON, supra note 74, §123, at 913. 
9S 
See Chapin, supra note 50 at 631 & n.57 (citing Richard G. Kent, Parental Liabil-
ity for the Torts of Children, 50 CONN. B.J. 452, 465 (1976). 
99 
See supra, note 96 for the monetary limits for each state's statute. 
100 See ARIz. REv. STAT. § 12-661 (1999) ("any act of malicious or willful misconduct 
of a minor ... shall be imputed to the parents or legal guardian having custody or 
control ... "); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (Deering 1999) ("Any act of willful misconduct 
of a minor ... shall be imputed to the parent or guardian having custody or control .. 
. "); ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 740 115/1 (West 1999) ("The legislative purpose of this Act 
is ... to compensate innocent victims of juvenile misconduct that is willful or mali-
14
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Most of these vicarious liability statutes have survived con-
stitutional challenges. For example, in Watson v. Gradzik,lOl 
parents challenged a Connecticut statute holding parents li-
able for a child's tort, claiming that the statute violated a par-
ent's fundamental rights to bear and raise children.102 The 
court upheld the statute on the grounds that it furthered the 
state's interest of controlling juvenile delinquency and com-
pensating victims for damages caused by minors. loa Accord-
ingly, the court stated, "with the right to bear and raise chil-
dren comes the responsibility to see that one's children are 
properly raised so that the rights of other people are pro-
tected. ,,104 
A North Carolina statute was similarly challenged and up-
held by the state Supreme Court in General Insurance Com-
pany of America v. Faulkner. l05 In this case, a child set fire to 
school property, the damage from which was paid by the 
school's fire insurance policy.lo6 The insurance company then 
sought reimbursement from the parents under the state's vi-
-----------------------------------------------------
cious; and ... to place upon the parents the obligation to control a minor child ... "); 
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § :3-112 (McKinney 1999) (''The parent or legal guardian, other 
than the state, a local sodal services department or a foster parent, of an infant over 
ten and less than eighteen years of age, shall be liable ... where such infant has will-
fully, maliciously, or unlawfully damaged ... "); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (West 
1999) ("A parent or other person who has the duty to control ... the negligent conduct 
of the child if the conduct is reasonably attributable to the negligent failure of the 
parent ... or ... the willful and malicious conduct of a child who is at least 12 years of 
age but under 18 years of age. ") 
101 
373 A.2d 191 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977). 
102 
See id. at 192. Section 52-572 of the General Statute provided that parents of 
an unemancipated minor who willfully or maliciously caused damage to any property 
were liable for the damage up to $1,500. See id. 
loa 




130 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. 1963). The statute made parents liable up to $500 for the 
malicious or willful acts of their children resulting in damage to property. See id. at 
647. 
106 See id. at '345. 
15
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carious liability statute.107 Subsequently, the pare~ts chal-
lenged the statute, claiming it violated their rights to due pro-
cess and equal protection under both the state and federal con-
stitutions. l08 After examining the statute's language, the court 
found that its purpose was to deter parental indifference and 
the failure to supervise children.109 Thus, because these were 
legitimate state purposes, the court upheld the statute to have 
been enacted within the state's police powers and not in viola-
tion of either the state or federal constitution. 110 
2. Parental Civil Liability As Imposed Under General Negli-
gence Theories 
In addition to vicarious liability, parental liability for the 
torts of children may also be based on the parent's own negli-
gence.111 For example, a parent may be liable if he or she neg-
ligently entrusts a child with a dangerous instrumentality1l2 or 
negligently entrusts an item to a child who has the propensity, 
because of the age or temperament of the child, to make the 
item dangerous.113 To prove such liability, the plaintiff must 
show that the parent owed him or her a duty, that the parent 
breached that duty, and that the breach caused the injury or 
d th 114 ea . 
107 See id. The insurer paid damages to the school board in the amount of 
$2,916.50. The statutory limitation for recovery against the parents under the vicari-
ous liability statute was $500. See id. 
108 
See General Ins. Co. of Am., 130 S.E.2d at 648-49. 
109 
See id. at 650. 
110 S id ee . 
111 
See KEETON, supra note 74, § 123, at 914. 
112 See id. at 913-14. For example, a gun is a "dangerous instrumentality." 
Matches and automobiles are also given as examples of items that can be become 
dangerous in the hands of a child with a dangerous propensity. See id. 
113 See id. See also Allen v. Toledo, 167 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1980) (holding parents civ-
illy liable when father negligently entrusted 80n with his truck when he knew, or 
should have known, that son was a reckless driver). 
114 
See KEETON, supra note 74, § 30, at 164-65. 
16
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a. The Duty to Control the Acts of Others: Parental Duty to 
Protect Others From Their Children 
To establish parental negligence there must be a showing 
that the parent has a legally recognized duty to protect others 
against harms caused by the child. ll5 Generally, there is no 
duty to control the actions of another to prevent harm to a 
third person.U6 An exception to this rule exists, however, when 
there is a special relationship between the parties, such that 
one person is expected to exercise cpntrol over the other's be-
havior.ll7 For example, an employer has a duty to prevent his 
or her employees from injuring others during the course of 
business. us Similarly, a bar owner has a duty to prevent in-
toxicated patrons from causing injuries to other patrons while 
occupying his or her establishment.u9 
This exception is commonly applied in cases involving chil-
dren because of the special relationship that exists between a 
parent and child.120 A parent's duty to protect others applies 
when the parent one, knows or should know of his or her abil-
ity to control the child, and two, knows or should know of the 
U5 See id. "The word 'duty' ... denote[s] the fact that the actor is required to con-
duct himself in a particular manner ... " See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 4 
(1965). 
U6 • 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, §315 (1978). ''There is no duty to control the 
conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another 
unless (a) a special relationship exists between the actor and the third person which 
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special 
relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to 
protection." [d. 
117S id ee . 
us 
See Palmer v. Keene Forestry Ass'n., 112 A 798 (N.H. 1921) (holding that an 
employer cannot send an employee on the road when employee is intoxicated). 
119 
See McFarlin v. Hall, 619 P.2d 729 (1980); Slawinski v. Mocettini, 403 P.2d. 143 
(Cal. 1965). 
120 
See KEETON, supra note 74, § 56, at 384-85. A parent's duty to their children is 
actually twofold. Aside from exercising reasonable care to protect others from their 
child's conduct, a parent also has a duty to protect their child from harm. The duty to 
protect a child appears more commonly in the criminal context. However, it is sug-
gested that as inter-family tort immunities are nullified, the duty to aid your child will 
more commonly appear in the civil context. See id. at 377. 
17
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necessity of such control. 121 Two cases illustrate the nature of 
this exception. In Linder v. Bidner,l22 parents allowed their 
son to play unsupervised with another child, knowing their son 
had the habit of "mauling, pummeling, assaulting, and mis-
treating" other children when playing. l23 Furthermore, the 
parents ignored and resented any admonitions or interference 
by others. l24 The New York Supreme Court, in examining 
whether the parents had a duty to protect the injured child 
from their son, stated "[i]t has uniformly been held that a par-
ent who knows of the dangerous propensities of his child is 
bound to use reasonable care to control the child so as to pre-
vent the indulgence in those propensities. ,,126 The court thus 
held the parents liable in tort for breaching that duty.l26 In the 
second case of Howell v. Hairston,127 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court applied a similar rationale. When reviewing a 
case in which an eleven-year old boy shot another boy in the 
eye with a BB gun, the court found that the parents knew the 
boy was a "bully," yet did not stop him from taking the gun to a 
local playground where small children regularly played. l28 Ac-
cordingly, the court found the parents negligent, having 
breacheq their duty to control the child because they knew of 
his reckless and malicious nature. 129 
This duty to control a child's behavior, although obvious in 
some cases, is limited. Even when a duty is found, a parent is 
only required to exercise reasonable care in controlling the 
child. 130 Furthermore, the duty only applies to the child's spe-
121 
RESTATEMENT OF (SECOND) TORTS, §316 (a) and (b) (1965). 
122 
50 Misc. 2d. 320, 270 N.Y.S. 2d 430 (N.Y. 1966). 
123 




See id. at 322. 
126 S id ee . 
127 
199 S.E.2d 766 (S.C. 1973). 
128 
See id. at 767-68. 
129 
See id. at 768. 
130 
See KEETON, supra note 74, § 56, at 384-85. 
18
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cifically known dangerous habits or disposition, not to any 
dangerous propensities that the child may exhibit. 131 Two 
cases illustrate this distinction. In the first case, Parsons v. 
Smithey/32 a fourteen-year old boy broke into a house and used 
a hammer to viciously attack a single mother and her two 
daughters. l33 The mother sued the parents for negligence in 
failing to control their son. l34 Prior to this incident, the boy 
had attacked a woman in the street, had followed a classmate 
and attacked her in her home, and had been moved from his 
seat at school because he was "poking and pummeling" other 
children. 135 In addition, he had been arrested twice for arson, 
three times for joyriding, and once for theft of his father's 
watch. 136 The trial court refused to allow the boy's previous 
criminal or school records into evidence, claiming that the 
prior acts and statements of school officials were not specifi-
cally similar to the acts complained of and thus had no rele-
vance in establishing whether the parents had knowledge suf-
ficient to exercise reasonable control.137 The Arizona Supreme 
Court disagreed, stating "to adopt the stringent rule of ex-
cluding all but specific similar acts to prove knowledge would 
most often leave the first of the most violent and vicious acts 
uncompensated. "138 The court thus emphasized that acts of 
prior violence are relevant to establish parental knowledge of 
specifically known dangerous habits or propensities and so 
held as admissible all evidence that would indicate the boy's 
propensity for the violence he ultimately committed. 139 
The second' case, in contrast, demonstrates that absent 
prior violent acts or prior use of dangerous weapons, parental 
131 S id ee . 
132 
504 P.2d. 1272, (Ariz. 1993). 
133 
See id. at 1273. 
134 S id ee . 
135 
[d. at 1275. 
136 
See id. at 1276. 
137 
See Parsons, 504 P. 2d. at 1276. 
138 





Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000
516 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
knowledge of specifically known dangers can not be estab-
lished. In Hall v. McBryde,14o a boy exchanged gunfire with a 
passing car, unintentionally hitting an innocent bystander.141 
Although the boy was living away from home to avoid gang 
contact, he had never been a gang member, had never been 
arrested prior to the shooting, and had no history of violent 
behavior or use of dangerous weapons.142 Furthermore, the 
parents, whose gun he used, had taken reasonable steps to 
hide the gun from him and only allowed him limited access to 
their home. l43 The Colorado Court of Appeals reasoned that, in 
general, parents are not liable for the torts committed by their 
children simply because of the parent-child relationship, but 
rather are only held liable when they fail in their duty to use 
reasonable care to prevent their child from causing harm. 144 
Because the McBrydes had no knowledge of their son's propen-
sity for violence through prior violent acts, the court held they 
did not breach their duty of supervision and control. 146 
In some instances the duty to protect others, arising out of a 
special relationship, has been greatly expanded to include an 
affirmative duty to warn others of impending harm. l46 This 
duty to warn potential victims of violence has most notably 
been imposed upon· psychotherapists. 147 In Tarasoffv. Regents 
of University of California, 148 an outpatient of a student health 
facility sought psychiatric help and confessed that he intended 
to kill his girlfriend. 149 After the psychotherapist requested 
that the campus police detain him, they did so for a short time, 
140 
919 P.2d. 910 (Colo. ct. App. 1996). 
141 See id. at 912. 
142 See id. at 913. 
143 S id ee . 
144 
See id. at 912. 
145 
See Hall, 919 P.2d. at 913. 
146 • 
See TaraBOft'v. Regents ofUmv. of Cal., 551 P.2d. 334 (Cal. 1976). 
147 See id. at 344. 
146 551 P.2d. 334 (Cal. 1976). 
149 See id. at 339. 
20
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but then released him.150 Two months later he killed his girl-
friend, the plaintiff's daughter.l5l In analyzing whether the 
psychotherapist had a duty to warn the girlfriend, the court 
focused on the special relationship between the therapist and 
patient and found it sufficient to create such a duty.152 Al-
though the court recognized the difficulty in predicting either 
future violent episodes or intended victims, the court held that 
the imposition of such a duty was imperative in keeping the 
public safe from potential violence. l63 "The risk that unneces-
sary warnings may be given is a reasonable price to pay for the 
lives of possible victims t1:tat may be saved."l54 Accordingly, the 
Court held that psychotherapists have an obligation to take 
reasonable steps to protect a third party when the therapist 
knows or, based on professional standards, should know, that 
his or her patient presents a serious risk of physical harm to 
the third party.155 
Although the duty to warn is most commonly applied in the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship, at least one pre-Tarasoff 
case imposed such a duty on the parents of a potentially dan-
gerous child.l56 In Ellis v. D'Angelo,157 the parents of a four-
year old boy hired a baby-sitter for their son without telling 
her that he habitually threw himself against others and forci-
bly knocked them down. l56 Consistent with this habit, the son 
violently attacked the sitter by throwing her to the floor. 159 
After citing the duty to control rule contained'in section 316 of 
150 
See id. at 339-40. 
151 
See id. at 339. 
152 
See id. at 343. 
163 
See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d. at 345. 
154 
See id. at 346. In contrast, the court found that the police who detained the as-
sailant had no special relationship with him, even though they had the ability to 




See Ellis v. D'Angelo, 253 P.2d. 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953). 
157 
253 P.2d. 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953). 
156 
See id. at 676. 
159 
See id. at 679. 
21
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the Restatement of Torts,l60 the court found that, in general, 
parents have a duty to exercise reasonable care to control their 
child when they know of the child's violent nature through epi-
sodes of past violence. 161 The court extended this duty to con-
trol by rationalizing that "reasonable care" included the duty to 
warn others of their child's dangerous propensities.162 Thus, 
the court found that the parents were negligent in failing to 
warn or inform the baby-sitter of their child's habit of violent 
attacks. l63 The Tarasoff court cited the Ellis decision when 
reasoning that there is a duty to warn even in cases in which 
the defendant is in a special relationship only with the person 
whose conduct creates the possible danger and not with the 
victim of that possible danger. 164 Thus, using the Ellis-
Tarasoff rationale, parents, like psychotherapists, must know 
of their child's propensity for violence and have a duty to warn 
te t ·al . t· 165 any po n 1 VIC 1m. 
b. Breach of Parental Duty: Parental Duty and the Reasonable 
Care Standard 
Parents breach their parental duty when they do not exer-
cise reasonable care to control their child. l66 The duty to exer-
cise "reasonable care" is a subjective duty, such that it requires 
conduct that a fictional "reasonable person" would exercise 
given the circumstances.167 In the context of parental duty, for 
example, the McBryde court ruled that the boy's parents did, 
indeed, have a duty to control their son. l66 The court, however, 
160 
See supra, note 121 and accompanying text. 
161 See Ellis, 253 P.2d. at 677. 
162 [d. 
163 See id. at 675. See also Zuckerberg v. Munzer, 197 Misc. 791, 95 N.Y.S.2d 856 
(1950) (holding parents negligent for failing to warn a household employee that young 
son had a well known and established tendency to assault people). 
164 
See Tarasoff, 551 P. 2d. at 344. 
166 See id. 
166 
See KEETON, supra note 74, § 32, at 173-74. 
167 [d. 
168 See Hall, 919 P.2d at 912. See also supra, note 140 and accompanying text. 
22
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found that Mr. McBryde exercised reasonable care under the 
circumstances by concealing from his son the fact that he 
owned a gun.169 The court further found that the McBrydes 
acted reasonably by limiting their son's access to their home to 
only during the day and only to pick up some of his clothes and 
other belongings.17o Because their son demonstrated no prior 
history of violent behavior or use of a dangerous weapon, the 
McBrydes took reasonable precautions to meet the required 
standard of care.171 In contrast, the Ellis court found that the 
parents of a four-year old boy who attacked his baby-sitter did 
not exercise reasonable care.172 The court held that because 
the parents knew of their son's habit of violently knocking peo-
ple down, they breached their duty to control when they left 
the child in the sitter's care without warning her of his violent 
di ·t· 173 SpOSl IOn. 
c. Fulfilling the Legal Causation Requirement to Impose Pa-
rental Civil Liability 
In addition to establishing that a parent has a duty to con-
trol a child, and has breached his or her duty, parental tort 
liability also requires that there be a reasonable connection 
between that parent's failure to control a child and the victim's 
injury or death.174 Courts generally have easily found such 
causation, particularly in cases involving children with guns. 
In Olson v. Hemsley,175 for example, a thirteen-year old boy 
169 
See id. at 913. 
170 See id. 
171 S id ee . 
172 
See Ellis, 253 P.2d. 678. 
173 
See id. at 677. 
174 See KEEToN, supra note 74, § 41, at 263-65. The concept of legal causation re-
quires both actual causation and proximate causation. An act or omission is not con-
sidered the actual cause of the victim's injury or death unless the injury or death 
would not have occurred without it. Actual causation is sometimes called the "but-for" 
rule: the defendant's actions or failure to act is the cause of the event if the event 
would not have occurred "but-for" his or her actions. See id. at 266. Proximate cause 
is established when a person's injury or death is a foreseeable consequence of another 
person's actions. See id., §41, at 273. 
175 
187 N.W. 147 (N.D. 1922). 
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shot and killed a sixteen-year old co-worker after retrieving a 
gun from the store's cash drawer.176 In analyzing the store-
owner's negligence in keeping the gun accessible, the court 
found that the defendant knew the thirteen-year old to be 
reckless.177 The court thus held that even though the defen-
dant did not fire the gun, his negligence caused the sixteen-
year old boy's death.17s 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Kuhns v. 
Brugger179 involved a similar situation where a third party left 
a gun accessible to children. In Kuhns, two cousins were 
playing in their grandfather's bedroom when one of them took 
a loaded gun from a dresser drawer and, while playing with it, 
shot the other. ISO This result was, or should have been, forsee-
able to the grandfather after he negligently left a dangerous 
instrumentality in an unlocked drawer in a room where the 
children had access to play. lSI In holding the grandfather li-
able, the court noted that the child's removal of the weapon 
from the drawer was not an intervening act and thus it did not 
break the chain of causation between the grandfather's negli-
gence and the child's injury.182 
From the above discussion it is apparent that parental civil 
liability in a negligence action rests on several elements. The 
first is the special relationship between a parent and child that 
imposes a legal duty on the parent to control his or her child's 
behavior. l83 The second is an act or omission by the parent 
176 See id. at 148. 
177 See id. at 150. 
178 See id. Civil law recognizes equally the parent-child and the employer-employee 
relationships as special relationships that give rise to a duty to control and to protect. 
See KEETON, supra note 74, § 56 at 376-77. Thus, the parent-child relationship is at 
least as strong, if not stronger because of parental controls, as the relationship dis-
cussed in Olson. 
179 135 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1957). 
ISO See id. at 399. 
181 S id ee . at 404. 
182 S id ee . 
183 
See supra, notes 115-165 and accompanying text. 
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that fails to control the child. l84 Finally, the breaching act or 
omission must be the legal cause of the harm. l85 Once all of the 
elements are met, the parent is civilly liable for any resulting 
harm. 
B. PARENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR VIOLENT ACTS OF THE 
CHILD 
Parental liability for the death of another may not only be 
imposed civilly, but criminally as well. l86 In the criminal 
realm, a parent can be liable under the different homicide 
theories or under parental responsibility statutes. 187 Although 
the homicide theories include varying degrees of murder, 186 
voluntary manslaughter,189 and involuntary manslaughter/90 
the discussion below is limited to the homicide theories that 
explore parental negligence as a basis for holding parents 
184 
See supra, notes 166-173 and accompanying text. 
185 See supra, notes 174-182 and accompanying text. 
186 
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAw § 1.3, at 14 (2d ed. 1986). 
The basic elements of a crime are an act or failure to act, the mental state that accom-
panies the act, and that the act or omission be the legal cause of the crime. See id. § 
3.2, at 193-94. 
187 
See supra note 81 for parental responsibility statute citations. 
186 See LAFAVE, supra note 186, § 7.1, at 605. Murder requires the intentional or 
knowing killing of another. See id, § 7.2, at 612. 
189 See id. § 7.10, at 653. Manslaughter requires the reckless killing of another. It 
is divided into two branches, voluntary and involuntary. See id. § 7.9, at 654. Volun-
tary manslaughter is an intended homicide that arises during the heat of passion upon 
reasonable provocation. See id. § 712, at 669. The most common example of reason-
able provocation is when a person finds his or her spouse or significant other in bed 
with another person. See State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309 (Tenn. 1987) (holding 
that adequate provocation existed to sustain manslaughter conviction and not murder 
when husband heard wife having sex with another man in defendant's bedroom). See 
id. at 312. 
190 See LAFAVE, supra note 186, § 7.13, at 675. Involuntary manslaughter is an 
unintended homicide, and is divided into criminal negligence manslaughter and un-
lawful act involuntary manslaughter. See id. § 7.12, at 668. Criminal negligence man-
slaughter requires the unlawful killing of another while engaged in a lawful activity 
without exercising due care. See id. § 7.12, at 668. Unlawful-act involuntary man-
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criminally responsible for acts committed by their children. 191 
Consequently, only negligent involuntary manslaughter and 
murder by depraved indifference are discussed below. 
Negligent involuntary manslaughter and murder by de-
praved indifference were developed over time as courts began 
to see a pattern of conduct, which resulted in a homicide, but 
which did not meet the traditional elements of common law 
murder. 192 For murder by depraved indifference, courts still 
require an intent to kill, but this is typically manifested in an 
extreme recklessness that reflects a total indifference to hu-
man life. 193 For negligent involuntary manslaughter, however, 
no intent is necessary; rather, some heightened degree of neg-
ligence is sufficient to obtain a conviction. l94 It is under these 
two theories, with their lessened intent requirements, where, 
under a strict legal analysis, some parents may find them-
selves criminally liable for the violence of their children. 
1. Imposition of Parental Criminal Liability For Involuntary 
Manslaughter Under The Theory of Negligence 
Although most jurisdictions recognize involuntary man-
slaughter, the statutory definitions vary.195 The Alaska stat-
ute, for example, does not distinguish between voluntary and 
191 Unquestionably, ifa parent intended to kill someone and put a gun in the hands 
of a two-year old and instructed him or her to pull the trigger, the parent could be 
guilty of murder by using the child as a dangerous instrumentality. See id. § 6.6, at 
571, discussing aiding and abetting criminal activity, either as a principal party or an 
accessory before the fact. Such is not the subject of this article. 
192 See LAFAVE, supra note 186, § 7.1, at 606. The common law definition of murder 
is the unlawful killing of another human being with "malice aforethought." Malice 
aforethought is an elaborate term used to describe the alternative mental states re-
quired to establish common law murder and can be established by showing an intent 
to kill, intent to cause serious bodily harm, extreme recklessness manifesting in a 
total indifference to human life, or the intent to commit a felony. See id. 
193 S id § ee . 7.1, at 605. 
194 S id § ee . 7.12, at 668. 
195 
See ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (Michie 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 
1999); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 265 § 16 (Law Co-op. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.205 
(West 1999); 'rEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04 (West 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-206 
(1999). 
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involuntary manslaughter and defines manslaughter as the 
intentional, knowing, or reckless killing of another under cir-
cumstances not amounting to murder in the first or second de-
gree. l96 In contrast, the California statute defines voluntary 
and involuntary manslaughter separately.197 While voluntary 
manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another person upon a 
sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, involuntary man-
slaughter is the unlawful killing of another person while in the 
commission of an unlawful act or without due care or circum-
spection.l98 Despite such statutory differences, negligent in-
voluntary manslaughter generally requires some minimum 
level of grossly negligent conduct that results in the death of 
another.l99 Furthermore, it requires either a failure to act 
when action is required, or by acting when it is not.200 This is 
different from the common law, which only recognized affirma-
tive acts, but not omissions, as a basis for liability due to 
criminal negligence.201 This common law exclusion of liability, 
however, was rejected by the Model Penal Code, which recom-
mended imposing liability for omissions that are either ex-
pressly defined within the statutory offense or otherwise im-
posed by law.202 Thus, because most states have adopted some 
form of the Model Penal Code, it is generally recognized that 
criminal liability may be imposed for a failure to act when 
there is a duty to do SO.203 
198 See ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (Michie 1999). 
197 
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1999). 
198 S id ee . 
199 
See LAFAVE, supra note 186, § 7.12, at 668. 
200 
See id. § 7.12, at 673. 
201 
See id. § 7.12, at 674. 
202 
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201(3) (1985). 
203 For example, the California involuntary manslaughter statue requires an un-
lawful killing that occurs "without due care and circumspection." See id. CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 192 (West 1999). See also Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (1962): Defen-
dant was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter for failing to provide food and 
necessities to a ten-month old baby left in her care, resulting in the child's death. See 
id. at 309. The court enumerated that there are at least four situations in which the 
failure to act may constitute a breach of a legal duty: 1) where a statute imposes a 
27
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a. The Duty to Control the Acts of Others: Parental Duty to 
Protect Others From Their Children 
As with the duties recognized in civil tort law, 204 criminal 
law imposes a duty on parents, as a result of the parent-child 
relationship, to act with regard to the conduct of the child.205 
Commonly, this duty requires a parent to act to protect the 
child.206 However, parents also have a duty to protect third 
parties from the acts of their children, but like civil tort liabil-
ity, the duty is not absolute.207 Rather, it only requires that the 
parent exercise reasonable control to ensure the safety of oth-
208 ers. 
b. Breach of Parental Duty: Criminal Negligence or Reckless-
ness 
To hold a parent criminally negligent, a greater degree of 
fault is required than the fault that is required to be civilly 
negligent. 209 At common law, criminal liability was not im-
posed merely because a person failed to exercise due care un-
der the circumstances, or was ordinarily negligent.21o The pre-
vailing rationales for the common law rule were twofold: first 
that criminalizing ordinary negligence would not deter the be-
havior and second, that carelessness was not considered suffi-
legal duty of care, 2) where a person stands in a special relationship to another, 3) 
where a person has assumed a contractual obligation of care for another, and 4) where 
a person has voluntarily assumed the care of another which results in the seclusion of 
the person to prevent others from giving assistance. See id. at 312. 
204 See supra, notes 115-165 and accompanying text. 
205 
See LAFAVE, supra note 186, § 3.3, at 203-207. 
206 See generally State v. Deskin, 731 P.2d 104 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (holding par-
ents criminally liable for endangering health of their children); State v. Walden, 293 
S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982) (finding a mother criminally liable for failing to prevent an 
assault on her child); State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1986) (holding a 
mother criminally liable for failing to protect her two children from abuse by hus-
band). 
207 
See LAFAVE, supra note 186, § 3.3, at 206. 
208 S ·d ee, . 
209 See id. § 3.6, at 232. 
210 Se ·d e, . 
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ciently blameworthy to impose criminal sanctions.211 These 
rationales still hold true today; thus, the majority of states 
view ordinary negligence as insufficient to hold someone liable 
for involuntary manslaughter.212 A minority, however, allow 
such ordinary negligence to sustain an involuntary man-
slaughter action, particularly where a dangerous instrumen-
talit h .. I d 218 y, suc as a gun, IS mvo ve . 
The meaning of "more than ordinary negligence" can vary. 
Some statutes may require that the defendant's conduct in-
volve a higher degree of risk, over and above the unreasonable 
risk necessary for ordinary tort negligence.214 Others may re-
quire a higher degree of risk coupled with a subjective aware-
ness of the risk created.215 Generally, however, most can agree 
that "gross negligence" encompasses varying degrees of "more 
than ordinary" negligence.216 Accordingly, parental criminal 
liability may be imposed when the parents' failure to control 
the conduct of the child rises to the level of criminal or gross 
negligence. In such cases, parents may be liable for involun-
tary criminal negligence manslaughter. 
211 See id. 
212 
See LAFAVE, supra note 186, § 7.12, at 672. 
213 See generally State v. Jenkins, 294 S.E.2d 44 (S.C. 1982) (stating that the crime 
of unlawful neglect of a child requires only ordinary negligence); State v. Hedges, 113 
P.2d 530, 536 (Wash. 1941) (stating that ordinary negligence sustains a manslaughter 
conviction where defendant shot companion while deer hunting); State v. Tucker 68 
S.E. 523, 527 (S.C. 1910) (stating that a person who causes the death of another by the 
negligent use of a gun is guilty of manslaughter, unless the negligence is so reckless as 
to make it murder). 
214 
See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 909 (Mass. 1944) (finding a 
nightclub owner is guilty of manslaughter when he created a "grave danger" to pa-
trons for failing to provide adequate fire escapes, even if defendant is "so stupid [or] 
heedless that he did not realize the danger"); State v. Gooze, 81 A.2d 811, 816 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951) (holding subjective standard is apparent from the word 
"conscious" in the statute; high risk implied from the wording "injury will likely or 
probably result. "). 
215 See Bussard v. State, 288 N.W. 187 (Wis. 1939) (holding that although the de-
fendant was "negligent in a high degree," he is not guilty of gross negligence man-
slaughter because he was not subjectively aware of the high risk of his actions). 
216 
LAFAVE, supra note 186, § 2.7, at 235. 
29
Lockwood: Criminal Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000
526 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
c. Fulfilling the Legal Causation Requirement to Impose Pa-
rental Criminal Liability 
Like the causation requirement for tort liability, all homi-
cide theories require legal causation.217 Accordingly, the de-
fendant's negligent or reckless conduct must be the "legal 
cause" of death for a conviction.218 Criminal causation, how-
ever, can be difficult to prove in cases where death is the result 
of negligent or reckless acts or omissions; as such, the conduct 
that resulted in death may not have been intended to cause a 
serious result.219 Thus, the victim or manner of death may not 
have been foreseeable.220 Nevertheless, where the victim and 
the manner of death is forseeable, the causation element may 
be satisfied for crimes involving gross negligence.221 
2. Imposition of Parental Criminal Liability For Murder Under 
Theory of Depraved Indifference (Conscious Disregard for Hu-
man Life) 
As a general rule, murder requires a greater culpability 
than manslaughter, thus murder by depraved indifference re-
quires that the defendant act in an extremely reckless 
manner.222 This recklessness must be' such that the person's 
actions reveal a total indifference to the possibility that some-
one could be killed or seriously injured. 223 It requires conduct 
that is so wanton or reckless that it demonstrates malice in the 
mind of the killer. 224 The degree of recklessness required for 
murder, as opposed to that required for manslaughter, was 
distinguished by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Com-
217 
See id. § 3.3, at 209. 
218 
[d. § 7.12, at 670. 
219 
See id. § 3.12, at 283. 
220 
See id. § 3.12, at 293. 
221 See id. § 7.12, at 673. 
222 
See LAFAVE, supra note 186, § 7.4, at 617. 
223 • 
See id. § 7.4, at 618. 
224 
See Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445, 447 (Pa. 1946). 
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monwealth v. Malone.225 In Malone, a young boy put one bullet 
in a gun, spun the chamber, pointed it at the victim's head and 
pulled the trigger three times, fatally wounding him.226 With 
one bullet loaded in the chamber and three attempts to fire, 
the boy had at least a sixty percent chance that the bullet 
would leave the gun and enter the victim's head, one of the 
most vital areas of the body.227 With these odds, it was more 
than reasonable to anticipate that death would result from 
these actions.228 Thus, the court found that the boy showed a 
"wickedness of disposition and hardness of heart.,,229 Further-
more, the court found the actions far exceeded the gross negli-
gence requirement for involuntary manslaughter; in fact, the 
acts demonstrated an extreme recklessness sufficient to sus-
tain a murder by depraved indifference conviction.230 
In conclusion, if parents were to be held criminally liable for 
a death caused by their child, several elements must be shown. 
For negligent involuntary manslaughter, a parent's failure to 
control a child's conduct must rise to the level of gross or 
criminal negligence.231 For murder by depraved indifference, 
the failure to control must be evidenced by extremely reckless 
conduct, a higher standard than gross negligence.232 In addi-
tion to conduct that is grossly negligent or extremely reckless, 
there must be a causal connection between the parent's failure 
to control the acts of the child and the death of a third party.233 
While there are currently no cases resulting in such parental 
225 See id. at 445. 
226 . 
See ,d. at 446. "Russian poker" is a game of chance in which each participant 
puts a bullet in one of the five revolver chambers, spins the chambers and then puts 
the mU2zle of the gun to his or her head and pulls the trigger. Each participant takes 
the chance of being killed or injured by a bullet. See id. at 447. 
227 See id. at 447. 
228 
Malone, 47 A.2d at 447. 
229 See id. 
230 See id. at 449. 
231 See supra, notes 209-216 and accompanying text. 
232 See supra, notes 222-230 and accompanying text. 
233 S ' ee supra, notes 217-221 an accompanYing text. 
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liability, the facts in school shootings or other similar acts of 
violence may provide the elements necessary to impose crimi-
nal negligence involuntary manslaughter or murder by de-
praved indifference charges. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. HOMICIDE PRINCIPLES CREATE A BASIS TO HOLD PARENTS 
CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF THEIR 
CHILDREN 
The law holds persons responsible for active, secondary 
criminal participation, such as aiding and abetting an inde-
pendent criminal act, but only when that person intended to 
participate in the primary crime.234 A person can also be held 
criminally responsible for the acts of a third party when that 
person's acts or omissions rise to a level of criminal 
negligence.235 The elements necessary for such a conviction are 
twofold. First, an act or failure to act must rise to the level of 
gross negligence or intentional recklessness.236 Second, that 
gross negligence or recklessness must cause the death of an-
other. 237 
234 Modern statutes typically treat people who are accomplices of another person as 
accountable for that person's conduct and define accomplices as people who solicit 
another to commit an offense or aid another in planning or committing it. See e.g., 18 
U.S.C.S. § 2 (1999) (holding person liable as "principal" actor when he or she aids or 
abets in the commission of a crime against the United States); CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 
(West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c: 2-6 (1999). Thus, the parent actions will rise to that 
of principal actor in a crime actually committed by the child. See e.g., Commonwealth 
....;: .• '. v. Keenan, 25 N.E. 32 (Mass. 1890) (reversing conviction off ather for keeping a com-
, mon nuisance and intent to sell liquor illegally, where evidence showed son did not sell 
liquor at father's direction); Commonwealth v. Slavski, 140 N.E. 465 (Mass. 1923) 
(affirming conviction of father for the illegal sale of liquor, where evidence showed son 
sold liquor in the home "under control" of father); State v. Resnick, 17 86 A.2d 143 
(N.J.Super. Ct. 1952) (affirming conviction of father for driving without a license, 
where he was a resident of New York and allowed son to drive in state of New Jersey 
without proper license). 
235 
See WAYNER. LAF'AVE& AUSTIN SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAw § 7.12, 673 (2d ed. 1986). 
236 
See supra, notes 209-216 and accompanying text. 
237 S d· ee supra, notes 217-221 an accompanYIng text. 
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To date, there are no such cases holding parents criminally 
liable for the homicides executed by their children;238 however, 
if there were, involuntary manslaughter or murder by de-
praved indifference theories would be the most likely methods 
for criminal convictions.239 Nevertheless, proving either case 
would raise significant evidentiary problems.24O The key ele-
ment of proof lies in the level of knowledge the parents have, 
or should have had, with regard to their children's criminal 
plans.241 Thus, for example, although there may have been a 
number of signs leading to the Columbine massacre242 and 
other school shootings,243 the evidence must show that the par-
ents had specific knowledge of the contemplated acts sufficient 
to show that their failure to act to protect the victims was neg-
ligent or reckless. 
1. Parents Cannot Be Held Criminally Liable Based Solely On 
Their Status As Parents 
Although a special relationship exists between parents and 
their children, courts have consistently stated that parents 
should not be held criminally responsible for their children's 
acts simply because they are parents.244 In State v. Akers,245 a 
New Hampshire statute held parents responsible for their 
child's illegal conduct of operating "off highway recreation ve-
hicles" on public roads.246 The court acknowledged that the 
238 See infra notes 344-381 and accompanying text, discussing the reasons for lack 
of such convictions. 
239 See infra notes 329-343 and accompanying text. 
240 See William Glaberson, Charging Parents of Gunmen Is Tough, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
26,1999, at A-I. 
241 
See LAFAVE, supra note 235, § 3.7, at 232. 
242 See infra, notes 336-384 and accompanying text. 
243 See supra, notes 1 - 71 and accompanying text. 
244 
See State v. Akers, 400 A.2d. 38 (N.H.1979). The defendants were the fathers of 
two minor sons who were found guilty of driving snowmobiles in violation of a state 
statute that prohibits operation of the vehicles on public roadways or at unreasonable 
speeds. See id. at 39. 
245 . 
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legislature clearly intended to make parents liable for their 
children's acts under the statute.247 However, the court found 
that a voluntary act or omission, of which the accused is physi-
cally capable of committing, was a necessary prerequisite to 
the finding of criminal liability. 248 The statute lacked this pre-
requisite because it did not require an act or omission by the 
parent, rather only by the child.249 Thus, the court held the 
statute unconstitutional because it violated the parents' due 
process rights by criminalizing the status of parenthood.250 
Similar challenges have been made to parental responsibil-
ity statutes.251 Critics argue that parental responsibility stat-
utes are designed to punish "bad parenting," rather than im-
pose criminal liability based solely on the independent conduct 
of the parent.252 These criminal statutes, however, have with-
held constitutional challenges.253 
247 . 
See id. at 39-40. 
248 See Akers, 400 A.2d: at 40. 
249 
See id. 
250 See id. 
251 
See generally Linda A. Chapin, Note, Out of Control? The Uses and Abuses of 
Parental Liability Laws to Control Juvenile Delinquency in The United States, 37 
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 621 (1997); S. Randall Humm, Comment, Criminalizing Poor 
Parenting Skills as a Means to Contain Violence By and Against Children, 139 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1123 (1991); Kathryn J. Parsley, Note, Constitutional Limitations on State 
Power to Hold Parents Criminally Liable for the Delinquent Acts of Their Children, 44 
VAND. L. REv. 441 (1991); Tami Scarola, Note, Creating Problems Rather than Solving 
Them: Why Criminal Parental Responsibility Laws Do Not Fit Within Our Under-
standing of Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.REv. 1029 (1997); Paul W. Schmidt, Note, Danger-
ous Children and the Regulated Family: The Shifting Focus of Pq.rental Responsibility 
Laws, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 667 (1998); Toni Weinstein, Visiting The Sins of The Child 
On The Parent: The Legality of Criminal Parental Liability Statutes, 64 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 859 (1991). 
252 See id. 
253 
See Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993). See infra Part V.B. for fur-
ther discussion of Williams v. Garcetti. 
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2. Courts Impose a Legal Duty to Protect Others Where the Re-
lationships are Similar To or More Remote Than the Parent-
Child Relationship 
Although parents are not liable for the acts of their children 
simply because they are parents, they may be criminally liable 
for failing to exercise reasonable control over their children.254 
This is because the criminal system, due to the custodial na-
ture of the parent-child relationship, imposes a duty on par-
ents to control their children for the safety of others.255 Despite 
this fact, the parental duty to control has not yet been tested in 
any case where parents were charged with the involuntary 
manslaughter or murder by depraved indifference that re-
sulted from negligently controlling their children. Courts 
have, however, imposed criminal liability on others in both 
similar or more attenuated custodial relationships than the 
parent-child relationship.256 
One example of a custodial relationship similar to that be-
tween a parent and a child is that between a business owner 
and his business. For example in Commonwealth v. 
Welansky,257 several hundred patrons and employees died 
during a fire in a nightclub after a busboy carelessly lit a 
match and ignited some of the decorations.258 The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts looked extensively at the con-
struction of the building and the availability of emergency ex-
its when determining the requisite duty of care.259 The court 
found that the defendant, as the owner of the nightclub, was in 
control of the building's construction and maintenance and 
thus had a duty of care to ensure the safety of his patrons.260 
The court also found that by failing to install fire doors and 
254 




See infra, notes 254-274. 
257 
55 N.E.2d 902 (Mass. 1944). 
258 See id. at 907. 
259 
See id. at 906. 
260 
See id. at 907. 
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maintaining proper exits, the defendant showed a wanton and 
reckless conduct and so held him guilty of numerous counts of 
involuntary manslaughter.261 The court reasoned that: 
[t]he Commonwealth was not required to prove that 
[the accused] caused the fire by some wanton or reck-
less conduct. Fire in a place of public resort is an ever 
present danger. It was enough to prove that death re-
sulted from [the accused's] wanton or reckless disregard 
of the safety of patrons in the event of fire from any 
262 cause. 
Another example of a similar custodial relationship was 
found in Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court,263 where the 
California Court of Appeals held a corporation and its presi-
dent liable for involuntary manslaughter after allowing a horse 
to escape from the ranch onto an adjacent highway where it 
collided with a car, killing its passenger.264 In so holding, the 
court examined the ranch facilities and found the corral fence 
to be in such a dilapidated condition that the lack of mainte-
nance constituted criminal negligence.266 
In Sea Horse Ranch, the court not only found the corpora-
tion liable,266 but the corporate president personally liable as 
well.267 To find the corporation liable, the court merely stated, 
"the criminal negligence of corporate officers or agents may be 
imputed to the corporation to support a charge of involuntary 
manslaughter.,,268 In holding the president liable, however, the 
261 See id. 
262 
Welansky, 55 N.E.2d at 912. 
263 
30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681 (1994). 
264 See id. at 683. 
266 
See id. at 687. 
266 See id. at 688. 
267 See id. at 690. 
266 Sea Horse Ranch, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 688. "California corporations can form in-
tent, be reckless and commit acts through their agents." [d. (citing Granite Constr. 
Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 467 (1983». 
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court found that he had the requisite knowledge and aware-
ness of the risks created by the ranch's horses to be criminally 
negligent.269 He not only knew of the dilapidated condition. of 
the corral fences and of the prior instances where horses es-
caped onto the highway, but he failed to install a safer fence.27o 
The court emphasized that the president was not personally 
liable solely because of his status as corporate president, but 
because he had knowledge and control of the risks created by 
the horses and had failed to act under his statutory duty to 
control the livestock.271 In articulating the controlling stan-
dard, the court ruled that no single omission by the defendant 
amounted to negligence, but that the defendant's collective 
omissions, in the context of the circumstances, constituted 
. . al li 272 cnIll1n neg gence. 
A custodial relationship that gave rise to a duty of care was 
also found in a more attenuated situation than either the par-
ent-child or the business owner-business relationship when 
prosecutors charged a fictitious entity with criminal 
negligence.273 Cited as the first criminal case of its kind, prose-
cutors filed third degree murder and manslaughter charges 
against Valu-Jet, an aircraft maintenance company, after a 
1996 airplane crash that resulted in the death of 110 people.274 
Prosecutors contended that the corporation breached its duty 
to protect the people it served by illegally transporting hazard-
ous materials on an aircraft.275 The prosecutors also claimed 
that for the deaths resulting from this breach, the corporation 
269 See id. at 689. 
270 
See id. at 690. 
271 S id ee . 
272 
See Sea Horse Ranch, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 687. 
273 See When a Crash Became a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1999, at A-24. At the 
time of this writing, the court's opinion is currently unpublished. 
274 S id ee . 
275 
See Deborah Sharp, Indictment Labels Jet Crash Murder, USA TODAY, July 14, 
1999. at 5-A. . 
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should be criminally punished for gross negligence.276 A case 
such as this suggests that liability could be imposed against a 
fictitious entity for breaching the duty to control its operations 
in a way that failed to protect its customers. 
In all three cases the courts found a duty to protect others 
from harm and imposed criminal liability on the defendants 
because their acts or omissions rose to the level of criminal 
negligence. However, in all three cases, the ability of the de-
fendants to control that which caused harm to others is not as 
strong as the ability of a parent to control the acts of their 
child. The special relationship between a parent and a child, 
which gives rise to a duty to protect others from the child, is at 
least as strong, if not stronger than the relationships and sub-
sequent duties imposed in Welansky, the Sea Horse Ranch de-
cision, and the pending 1996 Valu-Jet criminal charge. Par-
ents are expected to exercise authority over, carefully super-
vise, and teach their own children, certainly to the same de-
gree, or to a greater degree, then an employer to an employee 
or an owner to an animal. Thus, because the stronger parental 
duty is already recognized in criminal law,277 and may be far 
less tenuous, a parent's acts or omissions as reflected in a 
child's deadly behavior should therefore be legally subject to 
the same type of analysis as that used in the cases above. 
3. Parents' Acts Or Omissions May Be Sufficient To Find Legal 
Causation For Homicide 
The actions of children involved in school shootings may be 
so extraordinary that they are unforeseeable and, therefore, 
break the causal connection between the parents' acts or omis-
sions and the death of another.27s However, two compelling 
cases hold that the defendant's acts or omissions are suffi-
276 See id. Prosecutors filed the criminal charges claiming they are necessary 
where conduct is so grossly negligent, despite the fact that the only criminal punish-
ment against a fictitious entity such as a corporation is a criminal fine. See When a 
Crash Became a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1999, at A-24. 
277 
See LAFAVE, supra note 235, § 3.3, at 203-07. 
278 S id § ee . 3.12, at 293. 
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ciently direct to sustain a criminal charge, even though an-
other person actually executed the deathblow.279 In Common-
wealth v. Atencio,280 three men were playing Russian 
Roulette.281 The first two players each aimed the gun at their 
heads and pulled the trigger without incident.282 The third 
player, however, pulled the trigger and was killed.283 The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court rejected the two defendants' argu-
ment that the victim's willingness to play the game was an 
intervening act that broke the chain of causation.284 The court 
reasoned that although the defendants may not have had a 
duty to prevent the deceased from playing the game and that 
they need not even have suggested that he play, the defen-
dants nevertheless had a duty to not participate or join in the 
game.285 The court affirmed the involuntary manslaughter 
convictions holding that by merely playing the game the de-
fendants' actions could be seen as "mutual encouragement in a 
joint enterprise.,,286 
Similarly, in People v. Hansen,287 a California Appellate 
court upheld the involuntary manslaughter conviction of a 
thirty-five year old defendant who initiated a game of Russian 
Roulette in which a fourteen-year old boy was killed.288 The 
court found that the lower court was correct in refusing to in-
struct the jury on an intervening cause by stating: 
~9 . 
See Letner v. State, 299 S.W. 1049 (Tenn. 1927). The defendant was found 
guilty of involuntary manslaughter when he recklessly fired a shot into the river 
scaring the occupants of a boat so that they caused it to capsize. See id. at 1049. The 
court held that the act of victims in capsizing the boat was not a superseding cause 
sufficient to break defendant's liability for the death of two of the passengers. See id. 
at 1052. 
Z80 
189 N.E.2d 223 (Mass. 1963). 
281 




See id. at 225. 
284 See id. 
285 . 
See Atencw, 189 N.E.2d at 225. 
286 Id. 
287 
59 Cal. App. 4th 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
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[A] defendant may be liable for a [criminal homicide] 
when his or her acts were the 'proximate cause' of the 
death of the victim, even though he did not administer 
the fatal wound ... [I]n homicide cases a 'cause of the 
[victim's death] is an act or omission that sets in motion 
a chain of events that produces as a direct, natural and 
probable consequence of the act or omission the [death] 
and without which the death would not occur.,289 
The court thus held that a person can be criminally liable for 
the result caused by his conduct even if the victim's actions 
were a contributing cause.290 
Under the reasoning of Atencio and Hansen, parents are not 
required to participate or even suggest to their children that 
they act violently. Their mere presence and knowledge of their 
children's obsession with guns or other potentially dangerous 
behaviors may be enough to prove parental criminal negli-
gence. This argument may be particularly convincing in cases 
where the parents have stored loaded firearms in the home or 
have supplied guns to their children.291 
B. EXPANDING LEGAL DUTIES OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
ACTIONS OF OTHERS 
1. The Tarasoff Duty to Warn And Parents As Criminal Defen-
dants 
Parents, because of their special relationship with their 
children, may have a duty to warn others of impending vio-
288 See id. at 476. 
289 S id ee . at 479. 
290 • 
See id. at 481-82. 
291 See People v. Deskin, 13 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1992). The court in finding no unfore-
seeable intervening cause stated "the number and kind of situations where a child's 
life or health may be imperiled are infinite ... [t]he statute condemned the intentional 
placing of a child, or permitting him or her to be placed, in a situation in which serious 
physical danger or health hazard to the child is reasonably forseeable." [d. at 393. See 
also People v. Odom, 277 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1991). 
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lence, similar to the duty recognized in Tarasoff.292 The Tara-
soff court established that psychotherapists, because of the 
special therapist-patient relationship, have a duty to warn 
third parties of the dangerous propensities of their patients.293 
In so holding, the court partially relied on the Restatement of 
Torts "duty-to-control provisions,,,294 which state, "[o]ne who 
takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know 
to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is 
under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third 
person to prevent him from doing such harm.,,295 
The Tarasoff decision has been criticized for unduly ex-
panding the duty of control rationale articulated in the Re-
statement.296 The patient in Tarasoff was an outpatient, 
which, according to critics, makes the therapist's degree of con-
trol limited.297 Without this control, there is no special rela-
tionship to give rise to such a duty and, therefore, there can be 
no duty to warn.29S However, the Tarasoff court did not base 
its holding on the degree of control a therapist has over pa-
tients.299 Rather, the court imposed a duty based on the fact 
that some control existed and that the public interest required 
the therapist to breach the confidential nature of the relation-
ship to prevent violence from occurring in the future.aDO 
The court's rationale regarding the degree of control thus 
makes the scope of the Tarasoffdecision unclear. For example, 
292 See TarasotTv. Regents orUniv. orCal., 551 P.2d 334, 343-44 (Cal. 1976). 
293 S id ee . 
294 See id. at 343. 
295 
See REs'rATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 319 (1965). 
296 See Walter E. Johnson, Tort Liability in Georgia for the Criminal Acts of An-
other, 18 GA. L. REv. 361, 378-79 & n.103 (1984) (citing Alan A. Stone, The Tarasoff 




29S See id. 
299 
See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342. 
300. . 
See id. Emphasls added. 
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commentators have proposed an extension of the "Tarasoff 
duty to warn" to attorneys with clients who are potentially 
dangerous and who have made specific threats of violence. SOl 
The professional standards of the therapist, however, as relied 
upon by the Tarasoff court, may not apply to others who may 
be less capable of assessing a person's potential for violence.802 
Nonetheless, the court's reliance on the Restatement of Torts 
duty-to-control provisions could be applied to any person who 
has responsibility for, knowledge of, or control of another per-
son and who knows, or should know of the person's propensity 
for causing harm to others.803 Parents have such a duty to con-
trol their children, and typically should know of their child's 
propensity to harm. Furthermore, the special parent-child re-
lationship may be greater than that between a therapist and 
patient or an attorney and client because a parent's control is 
full-time, not merely limited to timed sessions or appoint-
ments. Thus, it would seem justified to extend the Tarasoff 
duty to warn to parents for the acts of their children. 
2. Civil Liability Imposed On Gun Suppliers and Manufactur-
ers Provides Link to the Imposition of Criminal Liability 
Like parents, the duty of gun suppliers and manufacturers 
to protect third persons is on the verge of expanding.804 His-
torically, gun suppliers and manufacturers have only been 
criminally liable for supplying guns to minors.305 To this end, 
both federal and some state laws prohibit the sale, delivery, or 
transfer of a gun to a juvenile.306 It was under these laws that 
801 
Johnson, supra note 292 at 378-79 & n. 125 (1984) (citing Patterson, Legal Eth-
ics, 34 MERCER L. REv. 197, 217 (1982». Patterson states that if one accepts the va-
lidity of the duty imposed on psychiatrists, it is a small step to recognize an attorney's 
duty to warn a client's intended victim of possible harm. See id. 
802




See infra notes 309-324 and accompanying text. 
805 
See infra notes 306-307 and accompanying text. 
806 
18 U.S.C.S. § 922(x) (1999) states: 
It shall be unlawful for a person to sell, deliver, or otherwise trans-
fer to a person who the transferor knows or has reasonable cause to 
believe is a juvenile (A) a handgun; or (B) ammunition that is suitable 
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the police, within days of the shootings at Columbine, arrested 
the man suspected of supplying the TEC-DC9 assault weapon 
to Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris.307 This arrest, however, does 
not mean that the supplier may be guilty of the Columbine 
homicides.30s The laws only hold gun suppliers criminally li-
able for making the gun available to a minor, not for any 
for use only in a handgun. (2) It shall be unlawful for any person who 
is a juvenile to knowingly possess (A) a handgun; or (B) ammunition 
that is suitable for use only in a handgun. ld. 
18 U.S.C.S. § 922(c) (1999): 
In any case not otherwise prohibited by this chapter [18 U.S.C.S. 
§§921 et. seq.], a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed 
dealer may sell a firearm to a person who does not appear in person at 
the licensee's business premises (other than another licensed importer, 
manufacturer, or dealer) only if (1) the transferee submits to the trans-
feror a sworn statement in the following form: "subject to penalties 
provided by law, I swear that, in the case of any firearm other than a 
shotgun or a rifle, I am twenty-one years or more of age, or that, in the 
case of a shotgun or a rifle, I am eighteen years or more of age; .. . ld. 
See also FLA. STAT. ch. 790.17 (1999): 
[A] person who sells, hires, barters, lends, transfers, or gives any 
minor under 18 years of age any dirk, electric weapon or device, or 
other weapon, other than an ordinary pocketknife, without permission 
of the minor's parent or guardian, or sells, hires, barters, lends, trans-
fers, or gives to any person of unsound mind an electric weapon or de-
vice or any dangerous weapon, other than an ordinary pocketknife, 
commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in § 
775.082, or § 775.083. A person may not knowingly or willfully sell or 
transfer a firearm to a minor under 18 years of age, except that a per-
son may transfer ownership of a firearm to a minor with permission of 
the parent or guardian. ld. 
See also NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1204.01(1) (1999): 
[A]ny person who knowingly and intentionally does or attempts to 
sell, provide, loan, deliver, or in any other way transfer the possession 
of a firearm to a juvenile commits the offense of unlawful transfer of a 
firearm to a juvenile ... Unlawful transfer of a firearm to a juvenile is 
a Class IV felony. ld. 
307 See CNN The World Today: Arrest Made in Columbine School Shooting (CNN 
television broadcast, May 4, 1999). The broadcast named twenty-two year old Mark 
Manes as the person suspected of supplying one of the four guns used in the attack on 
Columbine High School. The Jefferson County District Attorney said the nature of the 
charges was the possible violation of a statute that prohibits the sale or transfer of 
guns to juveniles. See id. 
80S See CNN Gun Provider Sentenced to 6 Years in Columbine Case (Nov. 13, 1999) 
<http://www.cnn.com/US/99111131columbine.manes.0l>. Manes was sentenced to six 
years in prison, on November 12, 1999, for supplying the TEC-DC9 to Eric Harris and 
Dylan Klebold. In the videotapes made by Harris and Klebold, they both thanked 
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deaths that result from the minor's use of the gun.309 This 
limitation exists because the causal connection required for a 
homicide conviction is often very difficult to prove.310 For ex-
ample, in Ayers v. Supreme Court of Iowa, 311 the court reversed 
an involuntary manslaughter conviction of a defendant who 
had sold a stolen gun to a minor for five dollars.312 The court 
held that although the defendant acted recklessly, a criminal 
conviction required a more "direct and specific" forseeability.313 
The court also stated that although a defendant need not ac-
tively participate in the immediate cause of death in order to 
be criminally liable, proximity to the harm beyond the sale of 
th . . d 314 e gun IS reqwre . 
While criminal liability has not yet been established, at 
least two courts have found legal causation sufficient to hold 
gunmakers civilly liable for the criminal use of their 
weapons.316 Such decisions may eventually provide a bridge 
leading to criminal liability.316 In the first case, Merrill v. 
Navegar,317 a disgruntled client walked into a law office and 
309 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(1)(q)(I)(B) (1999) ("The Congress finds and declares that .. 
. crime at the local level is exacerbated by the interstate movement of drugs, guns, and 
criminal gangs ... "). 
310 
See supra note 300 for Florida and Nebraska statutes. 
311 
478 N.W.2d 606 (Iowa 1991). 
312 See id. The minor took the gun to a party and was showing it off to the other 
guests. 'The gun went off and killed the minor's girlfriend. The defendant did not 
know of, and was not at the party. See id. at 607. 
313 
[d. at 608. 
314 S id ee . 
316 S . fro 3 d . ee m notes 31 -323 an accompanymg text. 
316 .. 
Criminal law and tort law are related branches of law. For example, both 
crimes and torts impose liability where there is a duty to act. See LAFAVE, supra note 
235, § 3.3, at 282-89. Additionally, crimes such as murder and manslaughter require 
causation as an element to be satisfied, similar to the causation requirements for 
negligence. See id. § 3.12, at 277. Whereas the criminal law has been slower to bor-
row from civil law absent legislative mandate, particularly where no criminal liability 
previously existed, civil statutes have been influential in the development of criminal 
law. See id. § 1.3, at 12. This is because civil law, like criminal law, serves to shape 
people's conduct for the benefit of society by holding individuals' accountable for their 
actions. See id. § 1.3 at 13. 
317 
89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146.(Cal. Ct.App. 1999). 
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opened fire, killing eight people and wounding six others before 
committing suicide. 31S One of the weapons used was a TEC-
DC9 automatic assault weapon manufactured by Navegar.319 
The victims and their families sued the gun manufacturer for 
negligent marketing practices but the gun manufacturer 
claimed that the suit was improper.32O In analyzing whether 
such a suit could be brought, the California Court of Appeal 
stated, 
"Navegar had a substantial reason to foresee that many 
of those to whom it made the TEe-De9 available would 
criminally misuse it to kill and injure others. Its tar-
geted marketing of the weapon 'invited or enticed' per-
sons likely to so misuse the weapon to acquire it. ,,321 
The court imposed on gun manufacturers a new duty to exer-
cise care not to increase or encourage the risk of foreseeable 
injuries, and ruled that the families could sue the manufac-
turer of the TEe-De9 under a negligent marketing theory.322 
This decision is similar to a New York court's ruling against 
gun manufacturers for their negligent marketing and distribu-
tion practices in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek.323 In this case, rela-
tives of six of the people killed by handguns, and one injured 
survivor and his mother sued twenty-five gun manufacturers 
for negligence.324 They claimed that the indiscriminate mar-
keting and distribution practices created an underground 
market in handguns that provided youths and violent crimi-
nals, like the shooters in these instances, with easy access to 
31S 
See id. at 152. 
319 See id. 
320 See id. 
321 
ld. at 165. 
322 
See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr.2d at 146. Gun manufacturer civil liability may still be 
an open question in California. The California Supreme Court granted review of 
Merrill in 2000. 991 P.2d 775 (2000). 
323 
62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
324 See id. at 808. 
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deadly instruments.325 The federal district court found that the 
defendant gun manufacturers had a special duty to the public 
not only because of the significant dangers posed by their 
products, but because the defendants knew of and did not pre-
vent the large scale diversion of their weapons to an illegal 
market.326 Through the defendants' inaction, the criminal mis-
use of handguns by third parties was not only a forseeable con-
sequence of their negligent marketing practices, but it was the 
expected consequence of their conduct.327 
These cases illustrate that under the theory of negligent 
marketing, gun manufacturers may now be held civilly liable 
for selling assault weapons that may forseeably be used in 
shooting rampages.328 Such decisions effectively impose a duty 
on defendants previously not considered to have a special rela-
tionship of care under the law. These cases also provide a 
causal link between these defendants and innocent victims of 
crime.329 Thus, as public attention turns to the causes of teen-
age violence, the duty to protect and the causal link estab-
lished in the gun manufacturer cases could be applied in 
criminal cases, 330 particularly where the relationship is less 
attenuated than that between a manufacturer and a pur-
chaser, as in the parent-child relationship. 
325 S id ee . 
326 
See id. at 827. 
327 See id. at 839. 
328 See Viveca Novak, Enter the Big Guns: The Feels Threaten Gunmakers with a 
Huge Lawsuit, and Most Can't afford Not to Talk Settlement, TIME, Dec. 20, 1999, at 
59. Twenty·nine cities and counties are suing gunmakers on behalf of the countries 
3,191 public housing authorities. They are seeking to recover the public costs of gun 
violence. The federal government is threatening to join the suit if the gunmakers do 
not agree to new marketing and manufacturing procedures. See id. 
329 . 
See Harriet Chiang and Kevin Fagan, Gunmakers Can Be Sued By Victims, S.F. 
CHRON., Sept. 30,1999, at A-I. 
330 See supra note 309 discussing the similarities between civil and criminalliabil-
ity. 
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3. Criminal Parental Responsibility: The Enforcement ofTru-
ancyLaws 
More tangible results in holding parents criminally respon-
sible for the conduct of their children can be seen in a new 
wave of enforcement of anti-truancy laws.331 The reason for 
such enforcement is the belief that truancy leads to juvenile 
crime.332 These statutes, generally called "delinquency stat-
utes" or "parental responsibility statutes," often can, and do, 
encompass anti-truancy measures as a means of ensuring that 
parents take responsibility for their children's behavior.333 If a 
parent fails to do so, and the child does not attend school, the 
parent can be jailed or fined. 334 This trend in enforcing current 
331 See Julian Guthrie, Parents Face Jail Time if Kids Miss Class, SAN FRANCISCO 
ExAMINER, Sept. 19,1999, at A-I. The penalties vary. In Ventura County, California, 
for example, school officials can fine parents $100 if their children are repeatedly ab-
sent, and could send parents to jail for a year. In Kern County, California, the fine 
can be as high as $2500 with the same threat of a year in jail. In Florida, parents of 
habitual truants face a $500 fine and the threat of sixty days in jail. See id. In Okla-
homa, parents can face fines that range from $170 to $260 and have served as long as 
twenty-three days in jail. See id. at A-13. 
332S id ee . 
333 See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering 1999) ("The purpose of the [former) 
statute was to safeguard children from those influences which would tend to cause 
them to become delinquent."). See also Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 530.060(1) (1998) ("the 
obvious legislative policy is to encourage the proper and diligent raising of the child in 
order to prevent an ultimate or final social disaster, namely, the child's finally be-
coming a neglected, dependent, or delinquent child. "). 
834 See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering 1999) (authorizes jail terms and 
criminal fines for negligent supervision and control of child which causes, encourages, 
or contributes to the delinquency of a minor). See also ALA. CODE § 12-15-13 (1999) (a 
parent or guardian cannot willfully aid or encourage acts of juvenile delinquency); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 709A.1 (1999) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3612 (1998) (unlawful 
to contribute to a child's misconduct or deprivation); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 530.060(1) 
(1998) (criminaJizing the endangerment of a child's welfare if parent fails or refuses to 
reasonably control child to prevent him from becoming delinquent); N.H. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 169-B: 41 (1999) (criminalizing intentional contribution to delinquency of a 
minor when a parent or guardian knowingly encourages or aids delinquency); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 14-316.1 (1999) (parents are criminally liable when contributing to the 
delinquency and neglect of child); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.050 (1999) (criminalizes en-
dangering the welfare of a child); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 260.10(2) (West 1999) (criminal-
izing the endangerment of a child's welfare if parent fails or refuses to reasonably 
control child to prevent him from becoming delinquent). The Alabama Code specifi-
cally addresses truancy: n Failure on the part of any parent, guardian, or other person 
having custody of the child to cause such child to attend school as required by the 
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truancy statutes illustrates society's recognition of increasing 
juvenile crime and the desire to make parents responsible for 
such actions.335 
IV. CRITIQUE 
A. APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENTS FOR HOMICIDE PERMITS A 
CRIMINAL CONVICTION FOR PARENTS 
Under a strict application of the law, a parent may be 
criminally liable for the homicides committed by his or her 
child based on the parent's independent conduct, which re-
sulted in the failure to control the child, if that conduct rises to 
the level of gross or criminal negligence.336 Likewise, a parent 
may be held criminally liable for homicides committed by his 
or her child if the parent's conduct is so reckless that it demon-
strates a conscious disregard for human life.337 Thus, even 
though parents may not have actually committed the homicide, 
their conduct preceding the crime may, in some circumstances, 
satisfy the required elements necessary for a conviction.338 
Nevertheless, to date, no court has held a parent liable under a 
manslaughter or murder by depraved indifference theory as a 
result of violent acts committed by their children. As public 
concern grows, however, particularly with regard to school 
compulsory attendance law shall be held to be encouraging, causing, and contributing 
to the delinquency, dependency or need of supervision of such child." ALA. CODE § 12-
15-13(a) (Michie 1999). 
335 
See Julian Guthrie, Parents Face jail Time if Kids Miss Class, San Francisco 
Examiner, Sunday September 19,1999, A-I, at A-13, citing Oakland school board 
president Noel Gallo, who stated: "1 want to send a message that parents have to be 
responsible for their children. Parents blame us when their kids don't succeed in 
school. But 1 can't do anything to increase achievement if they don't get their gets to 
school, and on time." [d. at A-13. 
336 
See supra notes 204-208 and accompanying text. 
337 
See supra Part notes 209-216 and accompanying text. 
338 
See e.g., People v. Hansen, 59 Cal. App. 4th 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). The Han-
sen court, citing People v. Gardner 37 Cal. App. 4th 473, 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) 
stated, "It is therefore, clear that a defendant may be liable for [criminal homicidel for 
the killing when his acts were the were the 'proximate cause' of the death of the vic-
tim, even though he did not administer the fatal wound." [d. at 479. 
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shootings, courts are likely to be faced with the question of 
whether such violence is the result of a parent's actions or fail-
ures to act and may even hold that parent responsible for the 
h ··d 339 omlcl e. 
In answering the question of whether the death of another 
was the result of a parent's failure to control, a court, following 
Welansky, need not require the failure to be the direct result of 
the death. The Welansky court, in finding a night club owner. 
criminally liable for manslaughter, held that the state did not 
have to prove that the defendant's reckless acts actually 
caused the fire that killed so many people.340 Instead, the state 
needed only to show that the defendant's conduct was so reck-
less as to jeopardize the safety of the patrons.341 Thus, once his 
conduct became reckless, he was responsible for the outcome, 
regardless of its direct cause.342 This distinction is important 
because it suggests that liability rests on whether the negli-
gent acts or omissions endanger the public, not on proving that 
such negligence directly caused the result. Accordingly, par-
ents may be criminally liable when the evidence shows that a 
parent's conduct in controlling his or her child was so reckless 
that it endangered the public, regardless of the specific action 
taken by the child. 
Under the above rationale, the parents in the Columbine 
case could legally be held liable because there were a number 
of prior bad acts involving the two boys that suggested they 
were a danger to the pUblic.343 Many of Harris' neighbors claim 
to have known what was going on with Harris and Klebold and 
339 See Karen Lowe, As Shock of Shooting Wanes, Search for Blame Picks Up, 
AGENCE PREss FRANCE, Apr. 26, 1999. See also Nancy Gibbs and Timothy Roche, The 
Columbine Tapes, TIME, Dec. 20,1999,40·51, at 50. See also Michelle L. Maute, New 
Jersey Takes Aim at Gun Violence by Minors: Parental Criminal Liability, Note, 26 
RUTGERS L. J. 431 (Winter 1995) (discussing parental responsibility statutes as a re-
sult of children and firearms). 
340 See supra note 258, and accompanying text. 
341 S id ee . 
342 [d. 
343 
See supra, notes 1-19. 
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wondered why the parents did not.344 If, for example, Mr. Har-
ris did disarm one of his son's bombs without telling the police, 
and his son did keep a number of dangerous weapons in his 
room, and teachers did warn both the Harris and the Klebold 
families of their sons' gruesome writings, then the parents may 
have demonstrated a failure in their parental duty to control 
and warn sufficient to rise to a level of criminal negligence or 
willful disregard for human life.345 
Similarly, because affirmative acts, such as supplying guns 
to depressed adolescent children,346 may also amount to grossly 
negligent or reckless conduct, if Kip Kinkel's parents were 
alive, they too might have been criminally liable under a strict 
legal analysis. Kinkel's parents knew of his fascination with 
firearms.347 In fact, Mr. Kinkel bought the guns for his son, the 
same guns used to both kill his parents and gun down his 
classmates.~ They also knew he was depressed and was tak-
ing Ritalin, a drug prescribed for hyperactivity.349 Further-
more, it is rumored that he bragged to classmates about tor-
turing animals with firecrackers and knives.35o If such allega-
tions are true, Mr. Kinkel's act of giving his son the guns used 
to kill his parents and his classmates, in light of Kinkel's trou-
bled past, ignores the clear signs pointing to Kinkel's potential 
for violence, and thus may very well fit the requirement of 
criminal negligence or willful disregard. 
344 See Jim Hughes and Jason Blevins, Father Had Hunch Son Was Involved, THE 
DENVER POST, Apr. 22, 1999, at A-14; Mother Questions Who Her Son Was, Everyone Is 
Trying To figure Out Why Teens Went On A Rampage, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Apr. 
26, 1999, at P7A; Kathy Kiely and Gary Fields, Colorado Killers' Last Days Gave No 
Hint Of Plans, USA TODAY, May 3, 1999, 7A; Karen Lowe, As Shock Of Shooting 
Wanes, Search For Blame Picks Up, AGENCE PREss FRANCE, Apr. 26, 1999. 
345 
See supra notes 13-19, discussing possible warning signs. 
346 See supra notes 22-29. See also John Cloud, Just a Routine School Shooting, 
TIME, May 31,1999, at 36-37. 
347 
See Cloud, TIME, May 31,1999, at 37. 
346 
See Frontline: The Killer At Thurston High; School Shooters (PBS television 
broadcast, Jan. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Frontline: School Shooters]. 
349 S id ee . 
350 
See Dave Saltonstall, Teen's House Bomb-Packed Searchers Discover an Arsenal, 
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, May 23, 1998. 
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B. SOCIETY'S RELUCTANCE TO HOLD PARENTS CRIMINALLY 
LIABLE 
547 
Even though a state could theoretically obtain a criminal 
conviction against a parent by demonstrating evidence of gross 
or reckless conduct, society may be reluctant to pursue such 
convictions because they are perceived as passing judgment on 
parenting decisions and interfering with the constitutional 
right to raise children.351 As expressed by the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court in Akers, society sometimes views convictions 
of this sort as punishment for merely being parents.352 The 
Akers court held that New Hampshire's motor vehicle statute 
was unconstitutional because it conferred criminal liability 
solely on the basis of parental status.353 In support of its 
holding, the court stated: 
Parenthood lies at the very foundation of our civilization. 
The continuance of the human race is entirely dependent upon 
it. It was firmly entrenched in the Judeo-Christian ethic when 
"in the beginning" man was commanded to "be fruitful and 
multiply." Considering the nature of parenthood, we are con-
vinced that the status of parenthood cannot be made a crime. 
This, however is the effect of [the statute]. Even if the parent 
has been as careful as anyone could be, even if the parent has 
forbidden the conduct, and even if the parent is justifiably un-
aware of the activities of the child, criminal liability is still im-
posed under the wording of the present statute. There is no 
351-
See Stephanie Salter, Blinded By Love - And By Stereotyping, THE PALM BEACH 
POST, May 1, 1999, at 15A. "Sooner or later, the rabid blame-layers will no doubt find 
something wrong with the Klebolds' and Harrises' parenting; the couples are human, 
after all, which means they make mistakes. But will it be enough to explain the 
enormity of their boys crimes?" Id; Kiely, USA TODAY, May 3, 1999, at 7A. "So nor-
mal that now, after almost two weeks of public outrage about warning signs that many 
say were ignored by the parents, school officials and police, more and more friends and 
classmates of the two gunmen say that no one could have seen it coming." Id.; Gibbs, 
TIME, Dec. 20, 1999, at 50. The district attorney is not sure it would "do any good" to 
charge the parents. Id. 
352 
See State v. Akers, 400 A.2d 38, 40 (N.H. 1979). 
353 •• • 
See id. at 39-40. The court CIted the relevant statute, RSA 269-C:24 IV, which 
provided that " the parents or guardians or persons assuming responsibility will be 
responsible for any damage incurred or for any violations of this chapter by any per-
sons under the age of 18." Id. 
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other basis fot criminal responsibility other than the fact that 
a person is the parent of one who violates the law.354 
In drawing this conclusion, however, the court failed to read 
the motor vehicle statute in conjunction with the New Hamp-
shire criminal code,355 which requires a voluntary act or omis-
sion for any criminal conviction.356 When read together, the 
motor vehicle statute can impose parental liability only when 
the parent acted in a way to further the wrongful conduct, 
failed to act in controlling the child's conduct, or negligently 
entrusted a minor to operate an off-highway vehicle.357 Thus, 
the focus is not on the relationship, but on the act or omission 
of the parent, which is the traditional prerequisite to imposing 
criminal liability. 356 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court decided Akers in 1979, 
before the growing rash of violence perpetrated by children 
sparked public concern.359 Since this outbreak, specifically in 
response to the Columbine massacre, the New Hampshire 
Legislature introduced a bill that would make parents, based 
on their own acts or omissions, criminally liable for the acts of 
their children under a criminal negligence theory. 360 The bill, 
354 See id. at 40. 
355 See id. at 40-41. Justice Bois dissenting, cited RSA 626:8 (Criminal Liability of 
Conduct of Another), which provides that" a person is legally accountable for the 
conduct of another person when he is made accountable for the conduct of such other 
person by the law defining the offense." RSA 626:1 I of the Criminal Code provides 
that all criminal liability must be based on a voluntary act or omission. [d. 
356 
See Akers, 400 A2d at 40-41. 
357 
See id. at 40. 
35S 
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN SCOTl', CRIMINAL LAw § 3.3, 210 (2d ed. 1986). 
359 
See supra notes 1-24. 
360 See Cissy Taylor, Parental Liability Can't Be Criminal Under New Hampshire's 
Laws, THE UNION LEADER, Apr. 28, 1999, at A-1. H.B. 721, 156th Leg., 1st Gen. Sess. 
(N.H. 1999). The bill would enact a parental responsibility statute: Consistent with 
the protection of the public interest, to promote the minor's acceptance of personal 
responsibility for delinquent acts committed by the minor, encourage the minor to 
understand and appreciate the personal consequences of such acts, and provide a 
minor who has committed delinquent acts with counseling, supervision, treatment, an 
rehabilitation, AND MAKE PARENTS AWARE OF THE EXTENT IF ANY TO WHICH THEY MAY 
52
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however, was sent to a study committee because "it had not 
been well thought out or researched.,,361 New Hampshire offi-
cials, expressing their reluctance to enact such a measure, felt 
it was unlikely a parent should be held criminally liable, par-
ticularly when a civil remedy is available.362 
The reluctance felt in New Hampshire is similar to that felt 
in other states where the constitutionality of parental criminal 
responsibility statutes have been upheld.363 In these states, 
although the laws are on the books, they are not being enforced 
due to the perception that the laws target "bad parenting" in-
stead of the acts or omissions by the parent that contribute to 
the violent acts of the minor.364 California is one such state, 
and in Williams v. Garcetti,365 the California Supreme Court 
upheld against a constitutional vagueness attack an amend-
ment to the parental responsibility statute.366 After noting 
that the amendment imposed a duty on parents and guardians 
to exercise reasonable care, supervision, and control over their 
minor children,367 the Supreme Court held that the amendment 
was not vague because it incorporated definitions and parental 
duties that had long been part of California tort law.368 The 
court thus found that the statute was not an attempt to punish 
parents for bad parenting, but rather was an attempt to im-
HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE DELINQUENCY AND MAKE THEM ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEm 
ROLE IN ITS RESOLUTION. Id. 
361 
See Taylor, THE UNION LEADER, Apr. 28, 1999, at A-I. 
362S ill ee . 
363 See Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993). 
364 See id. 
365 See id. The amendment to § 272 states "for the purposes of this section, a par-
ent or legal guardian to any person under the age of 18 years shall have the duty to 
exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control over their minor child." 
Id. at 508. It was challenged by a taxpayer's suit, alleging that its enforcement as 
amended constituted a waste of public funds since the amended statute was unconsti-
tutionally vague and overbroad on its face. See ill. at 509. The suit also claimed that 
the amendment was an unconstitutional interference with the right to privacy under 
both the federal and state constitutions. See Williams, 853 P.2d at 508-09. 
366 
Id. at 514. 
367 See id. 
368 See ill. 
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pose criminal liability on parents for their criminally negligent 
acts in not controlling their children. 
Despite the California Supreme Court's ruling in Garcetti, 
convictions under that statute, and similar statutes in other 
states, are rare.369 Such parental responsibility statutes have, 
however, been used as threats to encourage parents to control 
their children.87o This seems to be particularly true in Califor-
nia, where instead of criminal prosecution, the city attorney's 
office refers parents to parenting classes of a statutorily ap-
proved diversion program.871 If the parents do not attend they. 
are then threatened with criminal prosecution under the stat-
ute.872 None of these threats, however, have been carried out. 
Garcetti's affirmation of the statute and the lack of prosecu-
tion under it demonstrates the tension between society's desire 
to hold parents criminally responsible for acts committed by 
their children and its reluctance to interfere with family pri-
vacy or responsibility. The enactment of parental responsibil-
ity laws certainly demonstrates society's belief that parents' 
are responsible for juvenile delinquency, but the courts have 
been reluctant to actually enforce those laws.878 Thus, when 
violent acts by children occur, such as the Columbine massa-
cre, society expresses its dismay and anger through such 
869. . 
See Linda A. Chapm, Note, Out of Control? The Uses and Abuses of Parental 
Liability Laws to Control Juvenile Delinquency in The United States, 37 SANTA CLARA 
L. REv. 621, 652-53 & n. 183 (1997) (citing Claire Safran, Is It a Crime to be a Bad 
Parent? Holding Parents Responsible for Their Children's Delinquency & Crimes, 
WOMAN'S DAY, May I, 1990, at 64). 
870 See id. 
871 See Tami Scarola, Note, Creating Problems Rather Than Solving Them: Why 
Criminal Parental Responsibility Laws Do Not Fit Within Our Understanding of Jus-
tice, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1029, 1045 & n.156 (1997). 
872 Id. 
878 
Unless the parent had actually encouraged or solicited the child's delinquent 
act. See supra, notes 222-233 and accompanying text. 
54
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss3/4
2000] CRIMINAL LAW 551 
measures that ultimately die in the Legislatures374 or are so 
diluted they become empty threats of criminal prosecution.375 
In addition to believing that parental criminal liability 
judges parental ability and interferes with a person's right to 
parent, society may also be reluctant to hold parents liable for 
their own negligence because parents may identify with the 
difficulties that other parents face. Imposing liability may be 
. "too close to home" for parents who may have to sit on juries in 
parental criminal cases.376 These juries may fear that imposing 
manslaughter or second-degree murder convictions on fellow 
parents may expose all parents to potential criminal liability 
for the acts of their children.377 Similar fears have been shown 
in cases involving manslaughter charges for reckless driving.37s 
Initially, the identification of and sympathy with fellow driv-
ers, combined with the penalties associated with a manslaugh-
ter or murder conviction, led many juries to find the defendant 
not guilty.379 In response, states enacted various homicide by 
automobile statutes, which carry lesser punishments for ve-
hicular manslaughter and are specific to vehicle related con-
duct .380 As a result, juries were less tentative in holding fellow 
drivers guilty. If the punishment for parental criminal respon-
sibility statutes were similarly constructed the reluctance in 
convicting parents could likewise be lessened. 
374 
See Taylor, supra note 354. 
375 See supra notes 362 - 365 and accompanying text. 
376 See LAFAVE, supra note 350, § 7.12, at 674 (discussing statutory variations of 
involuntary manslaughter) (citing Robinson, Manslaughter by Motorists, 22 
Minn.L.Rev. 755 (1938); Riesenfeld, Negligent Homicide- A Study in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 25 Calif.L.Rev., I, 5 (1936». 
377 S id ee . 
37S See id. 
379 S id ee . 
380 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 630A (1999); HAw. REv. STAT ANN. § 707-703 (Mi-
chie 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-3405 (1998); MINN. STAT. § 609.21 (West 1999); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (West 1999); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.06 (West 1999) (reck-
less), § 2903.07 (negligent); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.08 (West 1999). 
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The final reason for the reluctance to hold parents crimi-
nally liable is that the parents of the perpetrators have already 
been punished enough. For example, the District Attorney in-
vestigating the Columbine case, when asked about the investi-
gation of the possible involvement of the parents of the two 
gunmen, stated that he was not sure that it would "do any 
good" to charge the parents, thus implying that they had suf-
fered enough.381 This idea, however does not conform to no-
tions for imposing criminal liability, which are deterrence and 
retribution.382 These purposes are achieved by punishing the 
undesirable behavior of failing to control children and failing 
in the duty to protect others.383 Thus, exempting parental con-
duct from criminal punishment would not serve to deter bad 
behavior and, in fact, may promote continued lack of supervi-
sion since there is no likelihood of criminal liability. 
, This reluctance to hold parents criminally liable may reflect 
a reticence to accept the fact that escalating patterns of youth 
violence are no longer contained in inner cities and with mi-
norities.384 School shootings of the past four years have in-
volved young, white males from both urban and rural areas.385 
Klebold and Harris, for example, come from "good homes, good 
families, and good schools" in an aftluent Denver, Colorado 
suburb. 388 Yet despite the growing evidence to the contrary, 
most Americans may still believe that explosive teen violence 
and senseless destruction occurs in urban cities and not in 
middle class white neighborhoods.387 The "it could never hap-
381 See Nancy Gibb8 and Timothy Roche, The Columbine Tapes, TIME, Dec. 20, 
1999, at 49. 
382 
See LAFAVE, supra note 350, § 1.5, at 24-25. 
383 . 
See id. at 22. 
384 
See Michael Romano, "No One Seems To Recognize' Urban Violence Minority 
Students See Double Standard After Columbine, DENVER RocKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, 
July 16, 1999, at 32A. 
388 
See Cloud, supra note 340. 
388 
Jim Avila and Tom Brokaw, Background into Trenchcoat Mafia Suspects and 
Their Crime, NBC Nightly News, Apr. 21, 1999. 
387 
See Salter, THE PALM BEACH POST, at 15A 
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pen here" mentality still prevails.388 That mentality may fuel a 
pervasive lack of parental supervision of potentially violent 
children. Thus, as youth violence continues to escalate, it is 
more important than ever to identify and deter parental negli-
gence that rises to a level of criminality. 
v. PROPOSAL 
Because of the inability to accept the apparent trend of 
youth violence, the identification of parents with others par-
ents, and the perceived judgment of parenting in light of the 
harshness of manslaughter and murder by depraved indiffer-
ence convictions, the creation of parental negligent homicide 
statutes may provide a viable alternative to convictions under 
traditional homicide theories. These new statutes should in-
clude specific standards designed to deter unacceptable fail-
ures by parents whose conduct already meets the established 
standards of criminal negligence or recklessness. Thus far, no 
statute has attempted to establish a bright line rule specific to 
parental negligence and the death of third parties perpetrated 
by their children. 
Some juvenile delinquency statutes, however, come close. 
For example, the California juvenile delinquency statute holds 
parents criminally liable when their children have committed 
acts of juvenile delinquency, but only when the parent's own 
conduct, relative to the child, is criminally negligent.389 To this 
end, the statute employs the definitions and parental duties 
that have long been part of California tort law; thus, it essen-
tially requires parents to exercise reasonable care in control-
ling their children.39o Like the California delinquency statute, 
the enactment of parental negligent homicide statutes would 
not interfere with the right to parent, nor would they judge 
388 See id. 
389 See e.g. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering 1999) ("Contributing to the Delin-
quency of a Minor," criminalizing such act or omission and defining parental duty as 
"the duty to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control over their 
minor child."). 
390 
See supra notes 358-361 and accompanying text. 
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poor parenting skills. Instead, these statutes would impose a 
legal duty on parents to protect the public from acts of chil-
dren, a duty already recognized in the criminallaw391 and em-
ployed in great measure in tort law.392 
In addition to alleviating the reluctance caused by the view 
that the traditional homicide theories punish bad parenting, 
parental negligent homicide statutes would reduce the likeli-
hood that parents, sitting as jurors, would identify and sympa-
thize with the parents who sit as defendants. This would occur 
in the same way that homicide-by-automobile statutes have 
reduced the identification problem: by punishing less severely 
and requiring a lesser degree of negligence or recklessness that 
that required for ordinary criminally negligent involuntary 
manslaughter.393 With this decrease in punishment and speci-
ficity to the negligent conduct, juries were less reluctant to 
convict fellow drivers. If the same were done with regard to 
parental negligent homicide statutes, society's reluctance to 
impose criminal liability on parents may also be reduced. 
There are other statutes that provide different treatment 
for specific homicide situations, distinguishing them from gen-
eral manslaughter statutes. For example, some states have 
enacted variations of homicide statutes which hold people 
criminally responsible for conduct that threatens public 
safety.394 Also, the Model Penal Code has created a separate 
391 
See supra notes 204-208 and accompanying text. 
392 
See supra notes 115-165 and accompanying. 
393 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 191.5, (Deering 1999) (gross vehicular manslaughter); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (Deering 1999) (gross negligence other than gross vehicular 
manslaughter); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 630A (1999) (guilty of vehicular homicide 
while driving under the influence); HAWAII REV.STAT. § 707-703 (Michie 1999) (negli-
gence); KAN.STAT.ANN. § 21-3405 (1998) (creates an unreasonable risk of injury); 
MINN.STAT.ANN. § 609.21 (West 1999) (grossly negligent manner or negligent manner 
while under the influence); N.J.STAT.ANN. § 2C:11-5 (West 1999) (reckless); OHIO REv. 
CODE § 2903.06 (West 1999) (reckless), 2903.07 (negligent). In California the punish-
ment for involuntary manslaughter is two, three, o~ four years. See supra notes 197-
98. In contrast, the punishment for vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence 
is one year. See supra note 386. 
394 
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.025 (West 1999): A person who causes the death of 
another in any of the following situations is guilty of manslaughter in the second de-
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crime called negligent homicide, which carries a lesser pun-
ishment.395 Under the Model Penal Code, negligent homicide 
encompasses any special situation, not limited to automobiles, 
that causes death or serious bodily injury.396 Like all of these 
negligent homicide statutes, the purpose of the new statutes 
would be to ensure the public's safety by criminalizing a par-
ent's failure to control his or her child when that failure leads 
to the death of another. 
The enactment of parental negligent homicide statutes 
would also remove some reluctance by dispelling the idea that 
the parents of violent children have already suffered enough. 
It would do so by carrying out the accepted purposes for im-
posing criminal liability on wrongdoers, which are to ensure 
public safety and to deter criminal behavior.397 With society 
looking to the culpability of parents in the wake of the con-
tinuing trend of youth violence, the absence of specific statutes 
targeting parental criminal negligence undermines the pur-
poses for imposing criminal sanctions on those who do not con-
form to societal standards. With the imposition of criminal 
liability on parents who fail to control their own children for 
the protection of others, however, the purposes for pursuing 
criminal convictions would certainly be accomplished. Moreo-
ver, the existence of such statutes would end society's inability 
to recognize that youth violence is a continuing trend, perme-
ating all economic and social situations. 
Admittedly, determining when the acts or omissions associ-
ated with parenting become criminally negligent is, and should 
gree: 1) the person creates an unreasonable risk of death or harm to another through 
his or her culpable negligence, 2) by negligently shooting another person while think-
ing that the victim is a deer or other animal, 3) by setting a spring gun or other trap, 
4) by negligently or intentionally permitting an animal with known vicious propensi-
ties to run uncontrolled, or 5) by committing negligent endangerment of a child (ex-
cluding first, second, or third degree murder). See also WIS.STAT.ANN. § 940.08 (West 
1999) (homicide by negligent handling of dangerous weapons). 
395 See MODEL PENAL CODE §210.4(1) (1962): criminal homicide constitutes negli-
gent homicide when it is committed negligently. 
396 S 'd ee 1 . 
397 
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be, difficult. Unlike drunk driving negligent homicide, where 
intoxication may be measured to impose vehicular homicide 
liability,398 the standards for "unreasonable parenting" can be 
less clear. However, our legislatures already have experience 
criminalizing parental contributions to juvenile delinquency, 
civil liability, and other specific homicidal acts. Thus, if the 
courts are unwilling to impose criminal liability on parents 
under traditional homicide theories, then state legislatures, to 
give guidance to a troubled society, are quite capable of enact-
ing negligent homicide statutes that encompass the negligent 
control of children by their parents. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Comment concludes that parental criminal liability is 
possible under current criminal law. Given the right circum-
stances, a parent may be criminally liable for the deaths 
caused by their children, through their own negligent or reck-
less acts when their acts breach the duty to control children 
and to protect third parties from their violence. Criminal li-
ability may also result from the breach of the duty to warn 
others of their children's violent propensities. Although civil 
liability is the more common result in instances where parents 
have breached these duties, there are no criminal convictions 
that hold a parent responsible for deaths caused by their chil-
dren. 
The most likely homicide theories in which parents may be 
criminally liable in cases like the school shootings are criminal 
negligent involuntary' manslaughter or murder by depraved 
indifference.399 This is true because they only require an ele-
vated degree of negligence or reckless disregard for human life, 
respectively, as opposed to the specific intent requirements of 
398 
Gross vehicular manslaughter under California Penal Code Section 191.5(a) in-
corporates California Vehicle Code Section 23152(b), Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol or Drugs. In so doing, the manslaughter code thus particularizes an estab-
lished measurement of intoxication (,08) such that the defendant is presumptively 
intoxicated. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 191.5, (Deering 1999) (gross vehicular man-
slaughter). 
399 
See supra, notes 186-233 and accompanying text. 
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first and second-degree murder.4OO Nevertheless, because 
criminal convictions under these homicide theories also require 
a showing that the parents' acts or omissions caused the 
deaths that occurred at the hands of their children, such con-
victions have been rare.401 One step toward finding a convic-
tion, however, may be found in civil cases where courts have 
established a new duty to not harm others on gun suppliers 
and manufacturers.402 This duty may one day extend into the 
criminal realm if the actions that breach that duty are suffi-
.tl ·403 Clen y egregIous. 
This duty may be expanded sooner if parental negligent 
homicide statutes are enacted.404 These statutes would provide 
an acceptable societal standard for imposing liability because 
the statutes would be specific to the conduct of negligent con-
trol by parents.405 Such statutes would also encourage greater 
control of children.406 More importantly, they would accurately 
reflect the purposes of imposing criminal punishment.407 In the 
absence of convictions of parents under traditional homicide 
theories, it is the job of our legislatures to enact legislation 
that addresses parental failures in controlling or warning 
against the explosive violence of their children.408 
400 See id. 
401 
See supra, notes 234-335 and accompanying text. 
402 
See supra, notes 304-330 and accompanying text. 
403 • 
See supra, notes 336-350 and accompanymg text. 
404 
See supra, notes 389-398 and accompanying text. 
405 
See id. 
406 See id 
407 See id 
408 See id 
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